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1. Introduction 
 
The topic of this study is Norwegian regional actors’ participation in trans-regional network 
coalitions, and its effect on their ability to influence EU policy. 
  
Brussels is a complex conglomerate of actors and interests operating in a multi-level decision-
making system, and all actors are continuously competing against each other to have a say in 
policy development within different sectors. In other words, it is almost impossible to single 
out the actors in possession of genuine power within this system, and as many researchers 
have found, it is difficult to make generalisations about influence in the EU policy processes 
(Richardson, 2006). In other words, the description professor Hugh Heclo gave of the 
developments in American public policy in the late 70s seems translatable to the situation in 
the EU today:  
 
[F]or a host of policy initiatives undertaken in the last twenty years it is all but impossible 
to identify clearly who the dominant actors are […] Looking for the few who are powerful 
we tend to overlook the many whose webs of influence provoke and guide the exercise of 
power” (Heclo, 1978 cited in Richardson, 2006: 11 [my emphasis]) 
 
The big issues, such as international trade, security and economy are, of course, still very 
important, and certainly attract the interest of both national governments and others, but the 
‘European policy game’ continues to be played at the lower, detailed policy level, undaunted 
by the larger circumstances. In short, the Union finds ways to ‘legislate in hard times’ 
(Richardson, 2006: 8). As intriguing as this might be, it is still the big ‘sexy’ questions that 
continue to draw attention also in the world of academics. There has been done some valuable 
research on the regional dimension in the EU, and on the functions of policy networks within 
certain policy areas in the EU decision-making system (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Börzel & 
Heard-Lauréote, 2009; Grindheim, 2009; Huysseune & Jans, 2008; Klepp & Lutnæs, n.d.; 
Rowe, 2011), however, these have almost entirely focused on exogenous circumstances 
surrounding these actors, and not on the added value for the actors involved in networks. 
Moreover, after weeks of searching through existing research on Norwegian regional actors 
operative in the EU arena, I have not been able to find a single study done on the topic of 
Norwegian regional participation in transnational policy networks; they all seem to focus on 
how the EU affects Norwegian regions, and not vice versa.  
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According to the Official Norwegian report on Norway’s relations with the EU (NOU 2012:2) 
Norway’s formal abilities to influence EU policy is limited, at least from a government 
perspective. However, all Norwegian regions are represented with offices in Brussels. What 
are these offices doing there? Are they simply listening posts for local and regional actors 
back home, or are they something more? And, if they are nothing more than information 
coordinators, then one needs to ask the question of whether there is unrealised potential in 
these offices. Can they serve as gateways for Norwegian influence in the EU system, and if 
so, how? All these questions are still unanswered, and therefore, the topic of the present thesis 
is not about the big and ‘sexy’ questions of European security issues or international relations, 
it is not even about what realists would argue is the only sound unit in international politics; 
the nation states. Rather it is about regions. 
 
Regional policy and regional development constitute a third of the entire EU budget, 
superseded only by agriculture (European Commission, 2012), and is one of the policy 
debates that continue to draw a multitude of actors, interests and stakeholders to the debate. 
Thus, the assumption can be drawn that regions and regional policy are very important in the 
European Union. It is the regions that are most directly affected by EU legislation, and they 
are also the ones appointed the task of implementing EU policy in many member states. In 
short, citizens affected by EU law live in the regions, and according to principle of 
subsidiarity decisions should be taken as close to the affected parties as possible, and thus 
encouraging regional mobilisation in EU policy-making (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998). 
Nevertheless, one cannot, with good reason, argue that regions have a big influence in high 
politics. The region of Mid Sweden, for instance, would not get far in trying to influence the 
outcome of EU foreign policy on its own, or in trying to set the agenda in the Economic and 
Financial Committee in the Council. Why then, are they, along 340 other regions from 
member states and 19 from non-members (Committee of the Regions, 2011), represented with 
permanent offices in Brussels, claiming political advocacy as one of their main objectives? 
Even more interestingly, what are Norwegian regions, which are not even a member in the 
EU, doing in the EU capital? This thesis argues that regional representations are important 
stakeholders in the EU policy game within policy issues of regional concern, such as cohesion 
policy, regional development, and funding programmes, and that they have realistic 
possibilities of influencing these. 
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This study is about the effect participation in transnational networks can have on regional 
actors’ abilities to influence EU policy, and the aim is to further increase the understanding of 
what this effect constitutes. It seeks to do so by examining the added value of such 
participation for the North Norway European Office and the Mid Sweden European Office, 
and how such networks are received and perceived by representatives in the European 
Commission and other relevant actors such as the Norwegian Mission to the EU and the 
Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU.  
 
The main question this thesis seeks to answer is: To what extent, and how, can Norwegian 
regional offices in Brussels act as gateways for influence in the EU through participation in 
transnational networks? To answer this, the questions underneath needs to be addressed: 
 
1. What function does Norwegian regional representations serve in Brussels? 
2. What function does networks serve in Brussels? 
3. Why do regional actors participate in networks? 
4. How are the networks perceived in the EU? 
 
Existing research on regional representations in the EU shows that regional representations 
serve an important purpose (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Huysseune & Jans, 2008; Marks, 
Haesly, & Mbaye, 2002; Moore, 2008), and the very continued existence of these offices 
reinforce this argument. Furthermore, the purpose served by such offices seems to be of such 
importance to its end-users that someone back home is willing to pay the bill, time and again. 
Why are regional representations in Brussels important for Norway, a country that is not even 
a member of the European Union? And, if political advocacy is an objective for these small-
scale regional offices, how do they go about trying to exert such influence?  
 
This study is based on a qualitative research design with a combination of analysis of existing 
research and theoretic analysis of empirical data collected through interviews. It will combine 
elements of existing research with data collected from actors operating at the regional level, 
the network level, and the supranational level. Existing and newly collected information will 
be analysed based on the theoretical framework of multilevel governance and the policy 
network approach. The analyses will be conducted at the network level, assessing the effects 
of participation on regional actors possibilities of gaining access to the institutions, the effects 
on their reputation and branding strategies, and on their continuity.  
	   10 
 
The present thesis is divided into seven chapters.  Chapter two accounts for definitions used 
throughout the study, the context in which this study is done, and the theoretical framework. 
The context is the regional dimension in the EU and the Norwegian regional actors’, and 
policy networks’ position within this dimension. Because this is a study on influence and 
regional possibilities of influencing EU policies, regions will be defined within two 
categories: Constitutional and administrative regions. This is due to the fact that existing 
research show that when studying regional advocacy, the characteristics defining these two 
types of regions are most decisive for measuring influence. All Norwegian regional 
representations are subject to the category administrative regions, meaning that a 
conglomerate of local and regional actors govern them, as opposed to constitutional regions, 
which are mandated by legislative bodies in their regions. This arguably limits their 
possibilities of influencing EU policy, because they are driven by the lowest common 
denominator approach, making it difficult to achieve collective positions, and the political 
anchoring needed to pursue advocacy. Furthermore, because the Norwegian regional actors 
are all small-scale operations with limited resources, they have arguably slim chances of 
achieving success when trying to influence policy in the complex and competitive political 
system in the EU. However, the case of the North Norway European office seems to be the 
exception to this rule, since they are actively, and also successfully (according to their advisor 
Andreas Østhagen) pursuing advocacy in their daily work.   
 
The theoretical framework used in the analysis is comprised of the theory of multilevel 
governance (MLG) in addition to the policy network approach. Multilevel governance theory, 
with its focus on the relationship between the different levels of power in decision-making 
may explain why regions is seeking influence in the first place; whereas the policy network 
approach, which focuses on explaining sub-systemic policy shaping and the 
interdependencies between actors at the meso (subnational) level, might help explain why 
regions choose to pursue influence in coalitions with others. Subsequently there will be a 
presentation of methodology and the analytical model in chapter three. The dependent 
variable in this analysis is influence, and the independent variables up for examination are (1) 
access, (2) reputation, and (3) continuity. The reason for why these variables have been 
chosen is because these characteristics are considered to be sine qua non for successful 
advocacy in Brussels.  
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Chapters four, five, and six constitute analyses based on one of the variables in the analytical 
model.  Access will first be assessed in chapter four, where the conclusion drawn is that the 
effect of participation in network creates greater possibilities for gaining access to EU 
decision-makers because networks are representations of scale, covering larger geographic 
areas, thus making them representative and legitimate actors in the political system, and 
finally, because they, due to their wider reach and aggregated interests, are considered to be 
efficient partners in the decision-making process. Chapter five analyses the effect of 
participation in a network has on a regional actor’s reputation as a credible policy actor in 
Brussels. The main argument is that, when seen from a regional perspective, participation in 
networks has an ambivalent effect on the reputation; meaning that in some cases using a 
network to profile and brand oneself can be a sound strategy, whereas in other situations 
going it alone is the more strategic choice. This is dependent upon the regional actors inherent 
characteristics and their qualifications within the policy area the actors is seeking to influence. 
For instance, it would be strategically clever of the North Norway European office to use a 
regionally oriented policy network to obtain a good reputation as a regional policy actor, 
whereas it would be counterproductive to use this same network to brand themselves as a 
actor with arctic policy expertise. However, seen from a supranational perspective, 
participating in a well-functioning policy network is considered as something entirely positive 
for a regional actor’s reputation and credibility. Finally, networks’ effect on continuity in 
regional representations, which are characterised by high employee turnover, is analysed in 
chapter six. The concludes that through their human dimension and socialisation function, 
networks can enhance continuity for its participants through transferring knowledge and 
educating its members to becoming functioning policy actors in the EU. Furthermore, 
networks may have an impact on continuity in a larger sense. By acting as ‘meaningful 
objects of identification’, networks can create a sort of path dependency, fostering stability, 
predictability and continuity within the cacophony of political interests in Brussels by setting 
standards of behaviour in the policy process.  
 
The concluding remarks and findings are presented in the seventh and closing chapter. After 
assessing and analysing existing research and empirical data, the reality is that Norwegian 
regions improve their chances of successfully influencing EU policy when participating in 
networks. However, this is not enough to ascribe them the ‘title’ of gateways of Norwegian 
influence, since regions advocate regional interests and preferences, as opposed to general 
Norwegian interest and preferences. Furthermore, regional actors are only decisive policy 
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actors within the areas concerning regional policy. Hence, Norwegian regional representations 
become gateways for Norwegian regional influence when participating in transnational policy 
networks, because, as explained by the Counsellor of Regional and Local Affairs at the 
Norwegian Mission of Norway to the EU, Jan Edøy: “It is absolutely pointless to act outside a 
network in Brussels. Networks are what the European cooperation is all about, and inputs in 
the policy process is worthless if it does not stem from a network”.   
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2. Advocating Regional Repercussions 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to the context and theory constituting the point of 
departure for the subsequent analyses. It accounts for the historical development of a regional 
dimension in the EU from the 1980s until today, along with existing research on European 
regions, different types of regional representations, and the area of activities and functions 
surrounding them. Throughout this account, the Norwegian regional representations will be 
positioned within this context in order to paint a picture of how they function in the EU 
system, and how suited they are at pursuing political advocacy in Brussels. This is followed 
by a presentation of the network dimension, which is the focal point of this study. Finally, the 
theories applied will be described in short.  
 
Norwegian regions have, according to existing literature on regional advocacy in the EU, 
limited possibilities of influencing EU policy. This is because regions pursuing political 
advocacy in Brussels are largely divided into two categories: constitutional and administrative 
regions. All Norwegian regional representations are subject to the category administrative 
regions, meaning that a conglomerate of local and regional actors – both public and private – 
govern them, as opposed to constitutional regions, which have a delegated set of legislative 
powers. Arguably, this limits possibilities of influencing policy in the EU, because they are 
driven by the lowest common denominator-position taken by their boards, making it difficult 
to achieve collective political positions and the political anchoring needed to pursue political 
advocacy. Furthermore, since advocacy in the EU is a time consuming and costly affair (due 
to the complex decision-making process that spans across long periods of time), and the 
Norwegian regional actors are all small-scale operations with limited resources, they should 
have slim chances of achieving success when trying to influence policy in a complex and 
competitive political system as the EU. However, participating in transnational policy 
networks aimed at influencing EU policy could strengthen their chances of success.  
 
2.1 Tracing the Steps  
 
Regions are defined in this thesis as NUTS II (Nomenclauture des Unités territoriales 
statistiques) regions of the European Union, which are described as “basic regions for the 
application of regional policies” (Eurostat, 2012). In the mid 1980s offices representing such 
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areas began establishing themselves in Brussels, but it was not until a decade later, when the 
Maastricht Treaty introduced the principle of subsidiarity and initiated a focus on the regional 
dimension of European integration, that the real surge in establishing regional offices came. 
In 1993 there were 54 registered regions, by 2002 the number had risen to 160, and in 2011 
there were 340 regions from member countries and 19 from non-EU-member countries 
(Marks, Haesly, & Mbaye, 2002; CoR, 2011). Few regional offices have left Brussels after 
being established there, and the surge in newcomers have never really ceased, especially not 
after the eastward expansion of the Union. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the 
regional presence in Brussels is moving from an initiation phase and into a consolidation 
phase, with the EU-expansion slowing down (Huysseune & Jans, 2008). This means that the 
offices that have been present in Brussels for some time now, are finished with experimenting 
with ways of how to run their offices, and are now expanding their offices in scope, resources 
and staffing. The new offices are mirroring the older and more established ones to be able to 
compete in the crowded space of actors in Brussels. This evolution and the perpetuation of 
regional engagement in EU affairs can, according to Carolyn Moore (2008), be regarded as an 
“institutionalisation of a regional voice in Brussels”, which has been fostered by the open and 
responsive attitude of the EU institutions, not to forget the fact that these institution have a 
real need for input and connections to the local civil society.  
 
Initially, regional offices were seen as, and so criticised for, outflanking national delegations 
and positions. However, there is no evidence that this is actually the case, since no national 
government has ever legislated against one of their regional offices (Moore, 2008). 
Furthermore, there has been established a legal framework to ease the relations between 
regional authorities and their representations in Brussels, allowing regions some 
independence and leeway, conditioned upon their operations not contradicting the foreign 
policy lines of their national governments (Moore, 2008). Instead, funding opportunities and 
the structural changes including a regional tire in the EU’s institutional framework, seem to 
be the main motivations behind regional engagement in Brussels (Huysseune & Jans, 2008), 
along with the expansion of EU prerogatives into the regional fields of competence, such as 
education and the media.  
 
It is evident that there are multiple reasons for why regional offices were drawn to Brussels, 
but boiled down it can be listed as: a search for funding opportunities, possibilities for 
influencing policy by advocating regional preferences, and the expanding EU competencies 
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resulting in growing pressures for regions to be present in Brussels to maintain regional 
powers. Having said so, the regional offices also serve multiple purposes in the EU system, 
which is conditioned upon what type of regional office it is. 
 
There is broad consensus among scholars on the existence of two different types of regional 
actors within the field of regional advocacy: constitutional and administrative regions 
(Huysseune & Jans, 2008; Marks et al., 2002; Moore, 2008). The difference between the two 
lies in their domestic political foundation. Constitutional regions represent a regional actor 
with a delegated set of legislative competences, such as the German Länder (states), or the 
Devolved Administrations in the United Kingdom of Wales and Scotland (Moore, 2008). 
Common to all constitutional regions is a strong political dimension to their work, based on 
the legitimate role of having a publicly elected legislative body in their region. Additionally, 
employees at such offices generally have stronger ties with their elected politicians at home, 
making it easier to pursue activities aimed at influencing EU policy. More precisely, they 
have a strong political foundation in their region making it easier to pursue political agendas. 
Administrative regions, on the other hand, are not so clear-cut in their goals and functions, 
due to their multiple stakeholders and diverse ownership. These offices are often public 
private partnerships, and their mandate may come from a mix of local and regional 
authorities, or they may be given from a broad range of regional actors partnering up: such as 
local government actors, educational institutions, business groups and private companies 
(Moore, 2008).  
 
The Norwegian regional representations in Brussels fall into the category administrative 
regions: They are either mandated by a conglomerate of official institutions and private 
enterprises, such as the Mid-Norway European Office, or by a compilation of different local 
and regional municipalities, such as is the case for the North-Norway European Office. The 
latter have greater possibilities of gaining political foundation in their region, since civil 
servants and politicians govern them. Nevertheless, in either case, the work and function of 
the regional office is decided in a management board with representatives from all 
stakeholders, following a lowest common denominator approach (Moore, 2008). This 
complicates the process of getting the political anchoring at home necessary for the pursuit of 
a political agenda in Brussels, and would result in the Norwegian regional offices having a 
stronger focus on ‘soft’ activities, such as gathering information and researching funding 
opportunities. This is confirmed by the NOU, where most regional representations reported 
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that advocacy (or lobby) activities were of secondary importance to them, preceded by 
information work (NOU 2012:2, p. 191). Nonetheless, influencing was reported as being an 
objective on their agenda, and should not be underestimated.  
 
2.2 Advocacy 
 
In this thesis influencing, or advocacy, is defined as any actions aimed at influencing policy. 
The reason for why the term advocacy is used rather than, for instance, lobbying, is that 
‘advocacy’ allows for a more comprehensive definition of actions aimed at political influence: 
“Advocacy activities can include public education and influencing public opinion; research 
for interpreting problems and suggesting preferred solutions; constituent action and public 
mobilizations; agenda setting and policy design; lobbying; policy implementation, 
monitoring, and feedback; and election-related activity” (Reid, 2000: 1). In other words, 
advocacy is the general promotion of an interest, idea, or cause, seeking to influence some 
aspect of society, such as individuals, employers or the government and its decision-makers. 
It is a widely used label, and it may, or may not contain measures of lobbying.  
 
This definition is consistent with the definition in the Official Norwegian Report on Norway’s 
relations with the EU (NOU 2:2012), which is part of the foundation for this paper, and can 
translate to information activities, networking, direct contact with EU officials and 
institutions, as well as more targeted actions and strategies aimed at influencing policy 
(Eliassen & Peneva, n.d.).  
 
In most cases the aim for advocacy in the EU is to change, or modify, a policy (proposal) to 
make it more favourable for one self. This is far more easy than trying to ‘kill’ or ‘block’ a 
proposal, as is most common in Washington or in national polities. This is due to the fact that 
EU officials in the Commission, which have monopoly on initiating policy, are not directly 
accountable to their constituencies, thus making it harder for advocates (or lobbyists) to 
credibly threaten direct electoral implications for EU action (Mahoney, 2008). Nevertheless, 
if one wants to be successful in advocating policy change there are certain aspects one needs 
to consider. 
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A trend in earlier research done on lobbyism, or advocacy, in Brussels is that they all claim 
that advocacy in the EU have certain characteristics that distinguish it from advocacy 
elsewhere, such as member states or in the US (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Börzel & Heard-
Lauréote, 2009; Greenwood, 2011; Mahoney, 2008; Mazey & Richardson, 2006). These 
characteristics, in addition to describing what form advocacy takes in the EU, also say 
something about the criteria for success in pursuing policy advocacy in Brussels. These 
characteristics are:  
 
• It is technical rather than political in nature 
• It is driven by information input and information exchange 
• It is European, meaning it favours European solutions to European problems 
• Due to the nature of the decision-making system in the EU, it is considered a long-
running game 
 
Influence in the EU is essentially technical, rather than political, and it is based on two pillars: 
credibility and competence (Guéguen, 2008). To be credible you need to see European 
solutions to European problems, rather than national solutions to national problems. And to be 
competent you need to be able to provide technical expertise on the issue at hand. 
Furthermore, it is easiest to exert influence in the early stages of policy making, meaning the 
Commission is the easiest target for influence. If one wants to succeed it is first and foremost 
important to be familiar with the decision-making process in the EU, and secondly, one needs 
to have a long-term perspective and be ahead of, and on top of, this process.  A long-term 
perspective is necessary according to Daniel Guéguen (2008: 97), because “in Brussels, 
influence is personal”, meaning that one needs to establish good contacts within the system, 
and over time prove to these that one is both credible and competent. Also, since influencing 
policy and legislation is a time consuming and costly pursuit, success is dependent upon the 
actor’s available resources. In addition to these criteria, there are some criteria that are almost 
too obvious to mention; you need to have a policy position to advocate; and you need to be 
able to justify your representativeness above the people for whom you are advocating. The 
latter meaning that you need to have close ties to publicly elected officials representing the 
civil society in your region in order to legitimise your activities and create some sort of 
accountability (Guéguen, 2008).  
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When regions pursue political advocacy in Brussels they are mainly concerned with policy 
issues and topics considered to be of regional relevance, such as; cohesion policy, regional 
development and state aid, structural funds, and the various funding programs intended to 
facilitate economic support and development in the regions. It is within these policy areas that 
regional advocacy and influence is deemed to be realistic, because regions are relevant 
stakeholders in these policy processes. In other words, regions are important stakeholders and 
players in the regional policy game, whereas on the other hand they would be at the back of 
the line in other policy areas, such as issues concerning the monetary union, or security and 
defence. It is furthermore important to note that advocacy in Brussels follows the flow of the 
EU policy process. Meaning that there are certain periods where it is extremely important for 
regions to be active advocates for their interests, for instance in the period of negotiating and 
formulating the financial framework for the next funding periods. And vice versa, there are 
times, for instance when the financial framework is settled and done, where there is less need 
for regional advocacy activity.  
 
Norwegian Governmental Influence 
‘Active European Policy’ is the collective term frequently used to describe the Norwegian 
policy towards the full range of European organisations, states and relations. According to the 
NOU (2012:2: 164) the term itself can also be understood as a political objective, rather than 
just as an analytical category, meaning that it can be used as a collective term to describe 
Norwegian (governmental) actors efforts to influence and contribute to EU policy formation. 
It is no secret that Norway’s leverage in the EU is rather feeble. Thus, in an attempt to disarm 
the controversy surrounding the lack of influence over EU policy, politicians frequently use 
the buzzword contribution to describe the situation instead of influence (Støre, 2012). 
 
Norway has relinquished the most important instrument for influencing EU policy by 
declining membership twice, and thus also the voting and representational rights in the 
European institutions. In other words, no matter how ‘active’ the European policy fronted by 
the Norwegian government is, its impact will still be limited in Brussels. Norway is a 
considered a ‘third country’ in the EU, and no matter how privileged the partnership may be, 
this will always be dependent upon the EU’s goodwill at the time (Hillion, 2011; Sverdrup, 
2008). Thus, Norway faces the same treatment and challenges as other third party actors when 
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seeking to influence EU policy, making general influence, as for instance influence on treaty 
design or overall policy developments, highly unrealistic (NOU 2012:2).  
 
Norwegian influence is to a large extent limited to individual cases and specific policy 
matters, and it success is hinged upon mutual interests between Norway and the EU (NOU 
2012:2: 165). Furthermore, Norwegian influence and contributions on EU policy formation is 
not about proposing new political ideas or initiatives, rather it is about reacting and 
responding to the developments within the EU and such initiatives from others. Thus, the 
NOU suggest that the ‘Active European Policy’ is not active at all; rather it should be named 
the ‘Reactive European Policy’ (NOU 2012:2: 164). On top of this, Norwegian possibilities 
have been further limited by the recent reforms made by the Lisbon Treaty. Among other 
things this reform included delegating more power, especially in the areas of implementation 
and supervision (which is considered to be the areas where Norway’s opportunities for 
successful influence are best) to sub-committees in the Commission to which Norway does 
not have access (NOU 2012:2); thus, making it even harder for Norway to follow the already 
complex and opaque decision-making process.  
 
2.3 Norway in the Regional Dimension 
 
To understand the presence of Norwegian regional representations in the EU system, it is 
important to be familiar with the development of a regional dimension in the EU system and 
the emergence of regional offices in general. Furthermore, one must account for the functions 
of such offices, and the general differences between them. 
 
Table 2. 1 - Overview of Norwegian regional offices in Brussels 
Office Permanent/long-term 
employees in Brussels 
Participation in networks 
North Norway European Office 3 3: NSPA, ERRIN, NEEBOR 
Mid-Norway European Office 1 0 
West Norway Office 3 1: ERRIN 
South Norway European Office 1 1: ERRIN 
Stavanger Region European Office 3 1: ERRIN 
Oslo Region European Office 4 1: ERRIN 
 
	   20 
Functions  
Gary Marks, Richard Haesly and Heather A. D. Mbaye (Marks et al., 2002: 4) have found that 
the overall function of regional offices is “gathering, exchanging, mediating and providing 
information” between the EU and their domestic constituencies. Huysseune and Jans (2008) 
adds to this the important functions of networking activities, liaison between regional 
authorities and the EU, and influencing EU policy. This seems to be true for most Norwegian 
actors as well. According to the NOU (2012:2: 191) information gathering and dissemination 
of such, is ranked as the most important function for both Norwegian non-governmental 
actors, such as regional offices, and national authorities such as the Norwegian Mission to the 
EU. This might be because of Norway’s limited abilities to influence decision-making, thus 
forcing them to take on a more reactive position of adapting to, rather than influencing, EU 
policy. Regardless, information is vital not only as an early-warning system, but also for 
Norway to be able to create more coherent and targeted strategies needed for succeeding in 
influencing policy cases. Furthermore, since Norway is not a member in the EU, regional 
offices may serve as some form of educational institution, in that they transfer valuable 
expertise on EU matters from Brussels to their end-users back home, and in promoting project 
participation fostering interregional cooperation and information exchange (Moore, 2008). 
The result is that regional actors gain improved knowledge and competence in EU matters, 
which can prove to be a fruitful reinforcement in Norway’s handling of its agreements with 
the EU.  
 
The functions served by administrational regions’ offices, such as monitoring and gathering 
information about EU policy, can be labelled ‘soft’ benefits. On the other hand, the 
constitutional regions, which are operating in the political dimension are more focused 
towards lobbying and influencing decision-making and policy, and can be said to provide 
‘hard’ benefits (Moore, 2008). To sum up, the functions and activities of regional offices vary 
in line with the type of office it is, and also with the characteristics of the end users who 
demand some form of return from their investment.  
 
Marks et al. (2002) further argues that ‘soft’ benefits, like information gathering and 
dissemination work, are the first steps on a ‘ladder’ of subnational office participation, which 
ends in seeking political influence. If one assumes this position, one can argue that all 
regional offices have an end goal of influencing policy and decision-making, and that as the 
process of consolidating the office’s representation in Brussels proceeds, the goal of gaining a 
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position to influence becomes ever more important. This might explain why Norwegian 
regional representations reported that influencing was part of their agenda in Brussels, but that 
this was not yet juxtaposed information activities. Furthermore, if one applies Marks’ logic to 
Norwegian regional offices, the ultimate objective for them would be to influence EU policy 
made relevant for them primarily through the EEA agreement, and they would thus report this 
being of importance to the office even though it might not be their main concern at the present 
time. 
 
Efficiency  
The efficiency of regional offices is conditioned upon several factors, and is hard to measure. 
First of all it is dependent upon what function the office serves. If the function is to provide 
‘soft’ benefits they can be obtained more easily than, for instance, policy work like advocacy 
and influencing, the latter is also harder to measure in terms of being successful or not. 
Secondly, it is conditioned upon resources. The larger and better funded an office is, the more 
likely it is to be able to provide ‘hard’ benefits and to perform its ‘soft’ activities more 
effectively (Marks et al., 2002). Furthermore, it is also conditioned upon staff and continuity. 
According to a study done by Carolyn Moore (2008), it is “noticeable that the offices where 
staff has been retained for a longer period of time are considered to be more efficient and 
effective operations”. Finally, if the office has close ties to home and a solid political 
foundation in its region, it can better speak on behalf of its end-users, and thus carry out its 
tasks more effectively.  
 
The NOU  (2012:2) defines Norwegian regional representations as non-governmental actors 
in Brussels, despite the fact that the ownership of the majority of them is comprised of public 
institutions in the regions (Eliassen & Peneva, 2012). However, according to the NOU 
(2012:2) the average number of employees in Norwegian non-governmental organisations is 
3.6. The regional offices are ranging from 1-2 permanent employees, as in the case of the 
Mid-Norway and South-Norway offices, to 3-5, as in the case of the North-Norway and Oslo 
Region office (see Table 2.1.). Furthermore, the majority of Norwegian non-governmental 
actors have small budgets of around 200 000 euros (NOU 2012:2). Much of the staff at 
Norwegian regional offices in Brussels are employed in interim positions as trainees or 
interns, and are frequently replaced.  In other words, the Norwegian regional offices are all 
small offices with limited resources and poor continuity, compared to the larger offices with 
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which they compete, which can have as many as 30 employees, as in the case of the many of 
the German Länder/states (Greenwood, 2011). For this reason, the Norwegian regional offices 
would arguably have limited possibilities of actually pursuing influence activities in the 
complex system of EU decision-making. Nevertheless, the Norwegian regions themselves 
reported that budgetary resources and size of staff were of little importance for them in their 
ability to successfully influence policy; they saw long-term perspective and staff continuity as 
more important. This is reflected in the size of the different Norwegian offices: The North-
Norway European Office, which is an active participant in several lobby-networks and 
regards advocacy as an important objective, has three permanent employees, whereas the 
Mid-Norway European Office, which is not concerned with advocacy, has one permanent 
employee (see Table 2.1).  
 
Relevance 
The importance and relevance of regional representations in Brussels depend on which 
criteria one assumes for making such an assessment. If the ultimate aim for regional offices is 
considered to be influencing, and the yardstick for such activity is seen as shaping the EU’s 
constitutional structure, then regional offices are rarely relevant actors (Marks et al., 2002). 
With this yardstick, even the Norwegian governmental actors would be irrelevant (NOU 
2012:2, pp. 164-195). But if one gives emphasis to the flow of policy on a case-by-case basis 
(especially in the policy areas of regional interest), they suddenly become more decisive 
actors, or stakeholders, engaged in influencing. In fact, in such areas they might be successful 
in steering funding in their directions, and in influencing the criteria for the distribution of 
such (Marks et al., 2002). Nevertheless, given that there exist no formal competencies 
delegated to regional representations in the EU, it is evident that the influence a region is able 
to exert will be ‘soft’, as compared to national delegations from member states who have 
representatives in the Council and the European Parliament (EP), or to constitutional regions 
with legitimate roles in the decision-making process (Marks et al., 2002). Having said this, if 
the presence of a regional dimension in the EU did not serve an important function, regional 
offices would arguably not have existed. They are important, among other things, as 
representatives of local and regional civil society and providing input in the EU system, and 
can arguably be perceived as an opportunity to close the EU’s infamous democratic deficit 
(Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Greenwood, 2011).   
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For Norway, the regional offices may be important as supplementary channels into the EU 
system for Norwegian authorities. According to the NOU (2012:2), the Norwegian 
government’s status as an outsider may give them difficulties in achieving their objectives 
through their established network, or through the existing framework for Norway-EU 
dialogue. The regional offices on the other hand, often have a wider network through 
participation in different umbrella organisations and federations, and thus have access to parts 
of the decision-making system not open to the Norwegian government. One can therefore 
argue that regional representations are able to advocate Norwegian interests inside arenas 
closed for the Norwegian national representatives (Eliassen & Peneva, 2012).  
 
Seeing the Norwegian regional offices in light of the success criteria for influencing, one is 
left with the impression that they have limited possibilities, if any, of influencing EU policy. 
They might even seem insignificant and irrelevant in this context. Brussels is a crowded space 
and the competition for attention has grown especially fierce after the eastward expansion in 
2004, limiting the possibilities of outsider’s such as Norwegian actors. In addition, not only 
European actors seek influence in the EU; many multinational corporations, such as Microsoft 
and IKEA, have also established themselves in Brussels to advocate their interests (NOU 
2012:2, p 165). In the middle of all this there is a growing desire in the EU institutions to 
make autonomous decisions, and not be too influenced by external interests. Summed up, this 
paints a rather grim picture of the possibilities for Norwegian regional offices (or any 
Norwegian actor) to get a say in the shaping of EU policy. Nevertheless, all Norwegian 
regional offices reported that EU legislation was of importance and relevance to them, and 
that seeking information on, and influencing such was an objective (Eliassen & Peneva, 
2012). How, then, and by what means do they seek to achieve this objective?   
 
Networks 
The term ‘network’ is frequently used to describe clusters of different kinds of actors who are 
linked together in political, social or economic life. Networks may be loosely structured but 
still capable of spreading information or engaging in collective action (Peterson, 2003). The 
term policy network connotes ‘a cluster of actors, each of which has an interest, or “stake” in 
a given policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure’ (Peterson 
and Bomberg 1999: 8). It is a form of coalition building among like-minded actors who share 
certain goals and interests in a given policy area, or in a region. Objectives and goals may 
vary, but overall they are based around the idea that there is safety and strength in numbers, 
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and that it is easier to achieve their political goals and objectives when cooperating. In 
pooling their resources they strengthen their voice, and function as umbrellas of influence on 
behalf of their members, in that they gain easier access to EU officials and politicians who are 
seeking collective European interests (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998: NOU 2012:2). Their 
activities mirror the interests of their members, and ranges from information gathering and 
information exchange, project participation, profiling and representation, to influencing EU 
policy in their area of interest (Greenwood, 2011). Furthermore, according to the theoretic 
assumptions of the ‘policy network approach’, which will be accounted for in the next 
chapter, networks exists in all forms and shapes, and exists on a continuum ranging from very 
loose to tightly integrated coalitions (Peterson, 2003). In one end you find loosely integrated 
ad hoc issue coalitions, who are temporary networks cooperating on specific policy cases, and 
in the other you can find interest groups organisations with permanent secretariats and formal 
internal decision-making procedures (Mahoney, 2008: 168). 
 
Network organisations arguably arises as a response to certain characteristics of the EU 
system, which encourage cooperative measures in the pursuit of influence (Bomberg & 
Peterson, 1998). Some of these characteristics are: the sheer size of the EU with nearly 500 
million citizens; the tendency for EU institutions to reward collective or ‘Europeanised’ 
interests; and the complicated and opaque decision making system.  
 
Umbrellas of Influence  
All Norwegian regional representations, except from the West-Norway Brussels Office, are 
members in some form of network organisation, and the North-Norway European Office is 
even member in three (see Table 2.1). Network organisations are invaluable arenas for 
Norwegian regional offices, as channels to parts of the decision-making process otherwise 
closed for Norway. According to Eliassen and Peneva (2011) all Norwegian non-
governmental actors, including the regional offices, reported that “[t]he most important way 
of influencing decisions is indirectly through European umbrella associations”. Furthermore, 
due to membership in such network organisations, the regional offices are often better 
informed on current developments and policy making in the EU than governmental 
representations such as the Norwegian Mission to the EU, and can thus be a valuable addition 
to information in the early-warning of Norwegian authorities (Eliassen & Peneva, 2012). The 
consequence of Norwegian non-membership in the EU and the lack of formal access to the 
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decision-making process through national representatives in the decision-making bodies is 
what constitute the importance of such network organisations (NOU 2012:2: 191). Through 
such networks, Norwegian regional offices can utilise the contacts of their peers in member 
states, and thus gain direct access to decision-makers and gain unique possibilities for 
influencing high-level EU officials (Eliassen & Peneva, 2012). Furthermore, since they are 
small representations with limited resources, networks can serve as an efficient tool enabling 
them to do much with little.  
 
Measuring network organisation’s successfulness in influencing EU policy is bordering on the 
impossible. Not because the work of these are more complicated than other influence-seeking 
actors, but because the dividends of such work is hard to measure in general. Nonetheless, 
there are some who claim their success. Claus J Schultze (2003: 135) argues that: “Through 
participating in policy networks and through intermediary organizations local politicians and 
civil servants clearly participate in European preference formation”. According to him, 
participants in network organisations do “[…] not only enjoy access to the policy arena, but 
they can exert joint influence and/or shared control over policy outcomes” (Schultze, 2003: 
135). Schultze find support for his reasoning with Justin Greenwood ( 2011); and, although 
Greenwood is less overt in his conclusions, he argues that regional representations serve an 
important function in the EU system, especially when forming interregional alliances, as 
carriers and liaisons of civil and public opinions, and that this should not be underestimated. 
 
If one accepts Schultze’s argument, network organisations can serve as transnational, or 
interregional, actors of policy influencing and interest representation. They become important 
tools for the promotion of information exchange, and the creation of common views and 
interests, which are much preferred by the EU decision makers and thus makes it more likely 
to gain approval for their input and interests (Bomberg & Peterson, 1998). This argument is 
reinforced by the NOU, which assert that Norwegian non-governmental actors participating in 
network organisation have the ability to adopt more Europeanised attitudes, which are needed 
to gain leverage in the EU system (NOU 2012:2: 191). All things considered, there seems to 
be some form of basis for arguing that Norwegian regional actors are valuable gateways for 
advocating Norwegian interests in the EU system, through their membership in transnational 
network organisations.  
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2.4 Multilevel governance and the Policy Network approach  
 
The primary theory used in this thesis is the theory of multi-level governance, as opposed to 
more state-centric theories, which have a too narrow focus on the relationship between the 
state and the supranational institutions in the EU for the purpose of the present study. 
Furthermore, this will be supplemented by the policy networks analysis approach, which 
according to some can be seen as a natural extension of the theory of multi-level governance, 
but which focuses more on the interaction between various actors in the policy processes in 
the EU (Peterson, 2003).  
 
There seems to be only one thing scholars of the European integration project can agree on, 
and that is that the EU is a complex system of policy-making which cannot be captured by 
one single theoretic model or approach (Mazey & Richardson, 2006; Peterson, 2003; 
Richardson, 2006; Rosamond, 2007). Although there have been several attempts at capturing 
the decision-making processes in the EU with one grand theory, it seems that the legitimate 
claim a theory can have on explaining the EU system is limited to a sector-by-sector basis. 
Meaning that one theory which might explain a certain process in one policy area and one 
level of decision-making, cannot necessarily explain the same in another sector and another 
level (Rosamond, 2007). Thus, John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg, congruent with R. A. 
W. Rhodes (1990), suggest that “different levels of action in the EU require different sorts of 
theory”, while identifying three levels of EU action: super-systemic, systemic, and meso 
(sectorial) (Rosamond, 2007: 127). This study is concerned with regional policy, which is 
located at the sub-national level, and defined as the meso level in this thesis. Bomberg and 
Peterson recommend at this meso level, “where regulatory complexity prevails, and where 
‘stakeholders’ in the policy process exchange information and resources”, the deployment of 
policy network analysis (Peterson, 2003; Rosamond, 2007: 127). Multi-level governance on 
the other hand, is good for explaining how the various actors at the different levels of 
decision-making interact. In short, the theory of multi-level governance may explain why 
regions is seeking influence in the first place, while policy network analysis might help 
explain why they choose to do so in coalitions with others.  
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Multi-level governance 
Multilevel governance (MLG) is an approach in political science that originated in European 
integration studies as a response to the more state-centric theories such as 
intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism and liberal institutionalism. It was fronted and 
developed by Gary Marks and Elisabeth Hooghe in the 1990s, and gives expression to the 
idea that there are many interacting authority structures at work in the emergent global 
political arena (Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996). The theory focuses on the relationship and 
entanglement between the different levels of authority both domestically and internationally, 
and argues that the state no longer monopolizes European level policy-making (Grindheim, 
2009). This is not to say that the theory rejects the state as important, or even that it remains 
the most important actor in the European policy game. Rather, it gives way to the idea that 
authority is increasingly moving away from national governments and has been dispersed 
both upwards to the supranational institutions, and downwards among a variety of public and 
private actors (Rosamond, 2007).  
 
The main logic behind MLG is that EU policy processes does not simply happen at the 
European level; rather it spills over into and integrates with the domestic political and legal 
systems in the various member states, triggering mobilisation of various actors, both public 
and private, at all levels of decision-making. Thus, although Robert Putnam’s ‘two-level 
game’ (1988) goes a long way in explaining how states and supranational institutions interact 
in international politics, it is not enough to explain the complex relationships between the 
various actors operating within the EU’s decision-making system. Multi-level governance 
presents three main assumptions regarding the European political system: First, that decision-
making competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolised by state 
executives; second, collective decision-making among states involves a significant loss of 
control for individual state executives; and third, political arenas are interconnected rather 
than nested (Marks et al., 1996). The latter meaning that MLG rejects the idea that 
subnational actors are nested exclusively within national arenas, and argues that they “operate 
in both national and supranational arenas, creating transnational associations in the process” 
(Marks et al., 1996: 346 [my emphasis]).  
 
Thus, according to MLG, to explain how policy-making in the EU occurs, one cannot only 
look to the intergovernmental bargaining process between member states, or between member 
states and the supranational institutions, but one must also account for, and analyse, the 
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independent role of actors at the European level, as well as at the local and regional levels 
(Marks et al., 1996). In other words, this approach rejects the separation between domestic 
and international politics, which constitute the very backbone of state-centric approaches. 
According to Simona Piattoni, the essence of MLG consists in three characteristics of 
contemporary political life: “Political mobilization occurs as much within institutional 
boundaries and through conventional procedures as across these boundaries and outside these 
procedures. Policy-making no longer separates neatly policy-makers from policy-receivers, 
nor does it distinguish between public and private actors, but rather needs to enlist all types of 
actors in all types of roles throughout the policy process. The polity addressed by political 
mobilization and producing policy decisions are less and less understandable as fixed and 
established, as institutions are constantly adjusted and procedures are constantly tinkered with 
by the decision-making processes themselves.” (Piattoni, 2009: 2).  
 
Multilevel governance theory has been criticised for lacking explanatory power and being too 
descriptive (George, 2004). Nevertheless, this theory provides a good framework for this 
study, as it incorporates all driving forces behind European integration, both at the local, 
regional, national and supranational level, and because the focus of this study, namely the 
Norwegian regional representations as actors in this system, must relate to all of the above. 
Furthermore, MLG makes a clear distinction between institutions, both national and 
supranational, as sets of rules, and the particular individuals, groups, and organisations which 
act within those institutions (Marks et al., 1996) - making it an actor-centred approach fit to 
describe the phenomenon constituting the crux of this dissertation; namely public and private 
subnational actors operating through transnational networks. And finally, the theory of 
multilevel governance perceives regional influence in the EU system as realistic, as opposed 
to state-centric theories that largely disregards the existence of actual political power beneath 
the national level.  
 
The Policy Network Approach 
The term ‘network’ is not a new phenomenon in social sciences, and the concept ‘social 
network analysis’ can be traced back to 1950’s sociology texts (Rhodes, 1990). However, 
‘policy network analysis’ is a relatively new approach within political science, and even more 
so within EU studies. The approach was first developed within, and applied to, domestic 
political contexts; however, the precise origin of policy network analysis is a matter of 
dispute. Jeremy Richardson (2006) claims British origins of what is now termed the network 
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approach, congruent with Rhodes’ (1990) arguing that ‘American political science was not 
the major formative influence’ on early work using network analysis in the late 1970s. A wide 
range of early work in both the UK, the US and Europe on interest intermediation, have 
attempted to develop the idea of networks as an analytical concept (Peterson, 2003). It was 
applied to studies of the decision-making system in the EU out of an understanding that it was 
impossible to try to explain how policy-making in the EU came about, without analysing how 
the various actors involved in the different processes interacted (Peterson, 2003). According 
to Peterson, this approach is especially suitable to apply to the EU because of its ability to 
explain sub-systemic (meso) policy-shaping, which makes it compatible with other theories of 
European integration such as intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism (which largely 
seeks to explain more high-level politics), and because of its ability to explain actual policy 
outcomes that are hard to explain using either of these other theoretical accounts (Peterson, 
2003).  
 
There are multiple interpretations and versions of policy network analysis, and it can therefore 
be hard to find a single representative version of this approach. For instance, the same 
terminology can be used to describe different phenomenon within different models, and 
different meanings are prescribed to the same term. For instance the term ‘policy community’ 
means “a particularly tightly integrated and single-minded policy network” in Rhodes’ model, 
where as it elsewhere is used to describe “actors and potential actors who share a common 
identity or interest” within a policy sector (Peterson, 2003: 4; Rhodes, 1990). Nevertheless, 
there is some order to this chaos.  
 
Policy network analysis operates on three basic assumptions (Peterson, 2003); first of all, it 
assumes that modern governance most commonly is non-hierarchical, meaning that there exist 
a mutuality and interdependence between public and non-public actors, and between the 
actors in these two groups as well. In other words, policy is not something that is simply 
enforced upon citizens and non-state actors by public authorities alone; it is created and 
implemented through interaction between these different actors and stakeholders, and also at 
different levels in the political system. Second, relationships between the different groups, 
actors, stakeholders and the governing bodies vary between policy sectors and areas, and also 
according to what governing institution (body) is in charge. And third, this approach 
recognises that governments are ultimately in charge of, and responsible for governance, but 
that this, nevertheless, fails to capture the whole process. Meaning that although elected 
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politicians are always the ones who finalise policies before they are implemented, these 
policies have prior to this gone through a formation period, in which they have been shaped 
and polished in bargaining processes between a multitude of actors and stakeholders, 
including non-state (subnational) actors, most of whom are acting through networks 
(Peterson, 2003). In this way, policy networks have, according to Peterson, the possibility to 
“narrow options and shift the agenda by pursuing strategies that generate new political and 
economic forces” (Peterson, 2003: 3).  
 
The concept of policy networks enables us to rationalise about complex decision-making 
situations constituted by multiple stakeholders and actors providing input when trying to 
influence policy outcomes (Rosamond, 2007). Such situations are most commonly defined 
not by a lack of politics and ideology, but by expertise and facts taking precedence over such 
in policy-making, and are an almost undisputed central feature of the EU decision-making 
system (Guéguen, 2008; Peterson, 2003; Richardson, 2006; Rosamond, 2000, 2007; Stone, 
2002, 2008). Furthermore, policy network analysis builds on assumptions put forward by the 
MLG theory, in that it “deals with the politics of influence and mutual dependency in 
situations where power is dispersed” (Rosamond, 2007: 127). When this approach was first 
developed and applied in domestic contexts, emphasis was put on the relationship and 
interdependencies between government departments, pressure groups, and various agencies 
and actors with an interest in policy outcomes. The main impact and legacy of this early work 
was that it guided us away from thinking about policy-making in terms of rule-bound 
interactions between (constitutionally defined) institutions that are organised hierarchically, 
and that it emphasised the need to understand the mutual dependency that obtain in different 
sectors (Rosamond, 2007).   
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3. Methodology  
 
My point of departure in this study is previous research done on the regional dimension and 
regional advocacy in the EU, presented in the academic work of the likes of Gary Marks, 
Elisabeth Hooghe, Elisabeth Bomberg, Carolyn Moore, and Carolyn Rowe (and others). The 
primary sources are the Official Norwegian Report on Norway’s relations with the EU (NOU 
2012:2) along with empirical data collected through semi-structured interviews with 
respondents in Brussels (see Table 3.1). Together these provide a solid foundation for 
understanding the regional dimension in the EU; the functions and objectives of regional 
representations; what purpose they serve in Brussels; and, how Norwegian regional 
representations fit into this picture. It also provides some understanding of the basic logic 
behind transnational networks, and why regions choose to participate in such, however, it says 
little to nothing about the added value such participation brings to the associated actors. In 
other words, although this study initially was intended to be a theoretical analysis of previous 
research, I discovered that there was not enough basis in the existing research to conduct such 
an analysis, and that to be able to analyse the effect that participation in transnational 
networks have on regions’ abilities to influence policy, new empirical data needed to be 
collected through interviews. 
 
The approach used is based on interplay between theory, existing research and empirical 
observations through interviews. A theoretical framework creates a guiding foundation for the 
empirical research, and the analyses draw on this framework and the existing research on the 
subject, in order to increase the understanding of what effect the network-dimension has on 
regional actors in the EU. In other words, the aim is to create new concepts and 
understandings based on an analysis of what is already known, by extending concepts of 
advocacy in the EU to the context of regional participation in transnational networks.  
 
3.1 Lost in Translation 
 
The selection of interviewees that have contributed in this study was based on informal 
communication with regional actors in Brussels, namely employees at the Mid Sweden 
European Office, North Norway European Office and the Mid Norway European Office, and 
I was fortunate enough to be able to tap into their network of contacts in Brussels. For my 
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interviews I wanted a variety of respondents, both at the regional level, the network level, and 
at the supranational level, and my assessment of the final selection in this study is that it in 
fact does reflect all these levels (see Table 3.1). I would have preferred to have interviewees 
from both the Commission and the EP, since these two institutions are considered the main 
targets for advocates in Brussels. However, this proved to be logistically hard to accomplish 
since the EP was in session in Strasbourg the week the interviews were conducted in Brussels. 
Having said this, I am very pleased with the variety in the backgrounds of the respondents I 
ended up with, since they represent; a regional actor in both a member state and Norway; 
Commission officials with experiences from different Directorate Generals; the director of a 
transnational network; and Counsellors from the national delegations of both Sweden and 
Norway.  
 
 
Table 3. 1 - List of interviewees 
Name Title Organisation/Institution 
Richard Tuffs Director ERRIN 
European Regions Research and Innovation 
Network  
Anonymous Program Manager European Commission 
Directorate General for Regional Policy 
Fredrik Tiger Program Manager European Commission 
Directorate General for Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries 
Former employee at DG Regio 
Anders Lindholm Counsellor for regional 
policy, competition and 
state aid 
Permanent Representation of Sweden to 
the EU 
Former National Expert from Sweden to the 
Commission 
Jan Edøy Counsellor for regional 
and local affairs 
The Norwegian Mission to the EU 
Former National Expert from Norway to 
the Commission 
Kerstin Brandelius-
Johansson 
Director Mid Sweden European Office 
Marlene Deogan Advisor Mid Sweden European Office 
Andreas Østhagen Advisor North Norway European Office 
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All the respondents have extensive experience with, and knowledge of the regional dimension 
in the EU. They are also familiar with each other’s work and the relationships between the 
different levels applied in this study. However, because the topic of influence is quite diffuse 
and hard to conceptualise, and the fact that it is next to impossible to successfully measure 
influence, especially in the diverse policy environment in Brussels, some of the interviewees 
were somewhat reluctant to express concrete opinions and statements on transnational 
networks’ effect on regional influence. This was especially true for the two respondents from 
the Commission (in particular the one who wishes to remain anonymous), who both 
repeatedly stated that what they said might not be the official opinion of the Commission. 
However, they did provide valuable insights into the mind-set of EU officials, and good 
examples from their previous experiences with working with regions in the Commission. 
 
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, where the interviewees were 
provided with a guide several days before the interview, in which a synopsis of this study and 
the topics of conversation I wanted to cover were presented. They did however not receive the 
actual questions I had prepared. In this way they had the opportunity to prepare for the 
interview, without being able to construct their answers beforehand, thus limiting the risk of 
them becoming preconceived or influenced by others in their responses. Consequently, I was 
able to capture the initial responses to my questions when asked, and arguably in this way 
also a truer picture of reality. Additionally it gave me more freedom when conducting the 
interviews, so that I could steer the interviewees through the topics in way more similar to a 
natural conversation and with better opportunities of asking follow-up questions, as opposed 
to following a list of questions slavishly. My experience was that by making the interview 
seem more like a conversation, the atmosphere became more relaxed and it was easier to 
establish trust and confidence with the respondents.  
 
When conducting interviews there is always a risk that you might steer you interviewees in a 
certain direction by asking too suggestive and leading questions. Because I was aware of this 
possibility, I took ample time when preparing the interview guide, and ran the questions by 
several of my fellow students and my supervisor before traveling to Brussels, in order to make 
sure they were not suggestive or leading. Furthermore, I was very conscious of this during the 
interviews, and formulated the questions carefully. However, the real challenge when 
conducting the interviews was linguistically related. A challenge both related to the execution 
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of the interviews, and to the follow-up work with the interview data. Since all my 
interviewees were either Norwegian or Swedish, I conducted all the interviews in Norwegian. 
There were some communication difficulties related to the interviews with some of the 
Swedish respondents, who did not understand certain Norwegian words and phrases. I 
resolved this by either explaining these words and phrases in English, or if I knew the 
Swedish translation, by speaking ‘svorsk’ (a mix of Swedish and Norwegian). The post-
interview difficulties were concerned with the risk of losing nuances in the Swedish 
information during the transcription period, when I translated the Swedish responses into 
Norwegian. I resolved this by sending the finished transcription to all interviewees, in order 
for them to read through it, give feedback and approve the translated version of the interview. 
Seven of the eight interviewees responded and approved the transcription, and the one that 
neglected to give feedback was one of the Norwegian interviewees, so the necessity for 
translation approval was absent.  
 
 
3.2 Modelling the Analytical Approach 
 
In order to analyse the data collected through the interviews in a comprehensible and 
unambiguous manner, the next step, after conducting and transcribing the interviews, was to 
put together a simple analytical model based on the theoretic foundation and previous 
research presented in chapter two, along with my first impressions from the interviewees’ 
responses. Very simplified and reduced to its bare essence, there are some assumptions that 
can be drawn (or hypotheses which can be presented) regarding the explanation of a networks 
effect on political advocacy in the EU. These assumptions can be divided into two categories: 
1) assumptions based on the EU institution’s position in the policy process; and 2) 
assumptions based on the position of single actors in the EU policy arena. In the first 
category, seen from the position of the EU institutions, the main assumptions can be presented 
as follows: 
 
(a) Networks have greater possibilities of gaining access to decision-makers due to their 
claim of representativeness and legitimacy 
(b) Networks are time and resource effective partners for an already small EU bureaucracy 
(c) Networks are seen as credible and competent partners for the EU institutions 
(d) Networks have greater possibilities to influence EU policy than single actors in Brussels 
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In the second category, seen from the position of single regional actors in Brussels, the 
assumptions can be listed as follows: 
 
(a) The chaotic and competitive policy environment in Brussels favours cooperation with 
networks  
(b) Networks can improve the reputation of small-scale, single actors in Brussels by 
profiling them as credible and competent policy actors 
(c) Networks are favourable arenas for small actors in Brussels when seeking to influence 
policy because networks are considered to be cost and risk reducing 
(d) Networks are favourable in that they provide a sense of continuity in a policy 
environment with a high degree of political uncertainty and employee turnover 
(e) Participation in networks can lead to extended use of the lowest common 
denominator-approach when preparing policy positions for influencing EU policy 
 
All these assumptions can be further reduced and simplified into three independent variables 
that can be used to measure the effect of network coalitions on the dependent variable 
influence for regional actors in the EU; (a) access, (b) reputation, (c) continuity. These 
variables constitute the analytical model that will be applied to the data collected from the 
interviews, and they are organised as follows: 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 1 - Analytical Model 
Networks   
Access 
  Influence Reputation 
Continuity 
 
 
 
 
The reason for why these specific independent variables have been chosen, and not for 
instance resources or legitimacy, is because access, reputation, and continuity are considered 
to be sine qua non for having influence in Brussels. Furthermore, these variables inhabit and 
transcend the other characteristics, such as legitimacy and resources, and are thus profound 
enough to be able to measure the broad effect participation in networks can have on regional 
actors’ possibilities of gaining influence. 
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After having conducted all the interviews and collected information on how actors in Brussels 
themselves define influence, one thing in particular became very obvious; access is the 
dependent variable in their own definition of having influence in the EU, followed by ‘being 
heard’. Thus, access constitutes the first part of the analysis, which will be addressed in 
chapter four. I will extract the information given by the interviewees directly related to the 
topic of access, and link this to the context and theory described in chapter two.  However, 
access alone does not create influence – it is only a necessary prerequisite for having 
influence. It is what one does after gaining access that determines the success of advocacy. 
According to existing literature (Guéguen, 2008), and indeed also the interviewees responses, 
gaining access is strongly linked to an actors reputation, which will be discussed further in the 
analysis in chapter five. Finally, these two variables are again influenced by systemic factors 
inherent in the EU (the chaotic and dynamic policy environment of high employment 
turnover) favouring continuity. Therefore, continuity will be the focal of the final analysis in 
chapter six. All three analyses will be approached in the same manner; by extracting relevant 
information given by the interviewees, relating it to the context of this thesis, and then testing 
the validity of the information presented in chapter two and in the assumptions above.  
 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that there are multiple other variables that may impact a 
regional actor’s ability to influence EU policy, such as the actor’s economic resources; the 
time of experience it has had in the EU system; its connections to the national government 
and regional officials; and, the nature of the actor’s mandate, objectives, and activities. If an 
actor has not been given the mandate, from its end-users, to pursue advocacy in Brussels, 
then, of course, this will impact the actor’s abilities to influence EU policy. Moreover, if it has 
limited economic resources, this will affect its operations and activities. However, due to the 
scope of this thesis, the variables generally deemed most important in existing research will 
be assessed, as further analyses of other variables is not considered feasible. My assessment 
of the variables chosen in the analytical model is that their generality and overarching 
qualities make them sufficient for answering the research questions in this study.  
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4. Assessing Access 
 
Regardless of the political system, country, or organisation in question, access, as in access to 
the policy process and decision-makers, is arguably the most important variable for pursuing 
advocacy activities and influencing policy outcomes. Without access there is no channel to 
influencing through – no way of reaching the decision-makers one wish to affect. According 
to Börzel and Heard-Lauréote, the emergence of networks is commonly motivated by a desire 
for such access, especially in a complex decision-making system such as the EU (2009).  In 
other words, it might be argued that the very existence of networks in Brussels is founded on 
a desire for access, and that the EU’s complexity makes it necessary to create networks and 
pool resources in order to gain such. However, it is important to stress that having access is 
not juxtaposed to having influence; it is merely a necessary prerequisite. 
 
There are multiple levels in the EU decision-making system and multiple actors, besides the 
national government, that have both the possibility and the objective to influence EU policy. 
Based on the analytical model presented in the previous This analysis investigates the 
following hypotheses:  
• 1 (a) Networks have greater possibilities of gaining access to decision-makers due to their 
claim of representativeness and legitimacy  
• 1 (b) Networks are time and resource effective partners for an already small EU 
bureaucracy  
• 2 (a) The chaotic and competitive policy environment in Brussels favours cooperation 
with networks based 
• 2 (c) Network coalitions are favourable arenas for small actors in Brussels when seeking 
to influence policy because networks are considered to be cost and risk reducing 
 
The empirical basis of this analysis is the data collected through the interviews, and the effect 
participation in a network has on a region’s possibilities to gain access to decision-makers in 
Brussels is its focal point.  
 
Norwegian regional offices have greater possibilities of gaining access to EU decision-makers 
when participating in transnational networks because; (1) they become part of 
‘representations of scale’ representing a lager geographic area which is, (2) considered to be 
efficient in the policy process, and (3) they become part of aggregated European interests 
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furthering legitimacy. In addition, the possibility of utilising contacts inside the EU 
institutions, which Norwegian actors lack, further increases the likelihood of gaining access.  
 
4.1 Representations of scale 
 
Advocacy is not just about influencing or changing public policy, it is equally much about 
minimising surprises.  Knowing what is going may be just as important as to trying to 
influence what is going on. Thus, the ability to influence is arguably dependent upon knowing, 
because it is difficult to influence policy without knowledge of policy, or at least the policy 
process. This is especially true for the EU with its complex and opaque system, and might be 
why Guéguen argues that in the EU “information is the main source of influence” (Guéguen, 
2008: 70). Commission officials with responsibility for drafting new policy are dependent 
upon substantial amounts of expert knowledge and information, and because the EU 
bureaucracy is relatively small, they have limited capabilities for gathering such expertise and 
information on their own, and are dependent upon this being provided by ‘outsiders’ (Heinelt 
& Niederhafner, 2008). This is in line with the logic of the policy network approach, which 
argues that there exists interdependence between different levels of public actors, and 
between public and private actors. Jan Edøy underpins this by stating that “the Commission is 
entirely dependent upon having a dialogue with the regions in Europe to be able to make a 
cohesion policy”. This is supported by the director of the Mid Sweden European Office, 
Kerstin Brandelius-Johansson, stating that “the Commission is always seeking regional input 
and opinions”. Marlene Deogan, advisor at the Mid Sweden European Office, further 
emphasised that “the Commission use regional network organisations to get in touch with 
regions, and vice versa, the regions use networks to get in touch with the Commission, or 
other institutions, such as the EP”. In other words, they are all supporting the argument of 
interdependency. 
 
There are numerous actors, from regions to corporations and NGOs, in the EU capital that are 
craving and competing to provide input to the institutions. The result is that EU officials are 
operating in what the Commission official in DG Regio calls ‘an existence of information 
abundance’, with limited abilities and resources to sift out what is relevant and not. I argue 
that the systemic effect of this chaotic environment coupled with the information and input 
dependency that exist in the EU policy process, has created a bias towards compounded 
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European interests representing larger geographic areas through transnational networks; an 
effect I have chosen to call the ‘representation of scale-effect’. The logic behind the 
representations of scale-effect is founded in the very nature of networks. Since they are 
commonly comprised of many smaller actors from different member states working together 
to overcome differences and provide input to the institutions, networks become symbols of 
collected, representative European interests, and have arguably greater possibilities of gaining 
access to the decision-makers.  
 
The representation of scale-effect seems to be one of the main motivations pulling regions 
into network participation. Andreas Østhagen, from the North Norway European Office, listed 
“large-scale impact and effect” as one of the main motivations behind his office’s 
participation in policy networks such as the Northern Sparsely Populated Area network 
(NSPA). Furthermore, according to Marlene Deogan, advisor at the Mid Sweden European 
Office, another essential pull factor for a small region, such as themselves was the idea that 
pooling resources and cooperating with others gave them “a stronger voice towards the EU 
institutions”. Jan Edøy substantiates this by explaining that since pursuing advocacy activities 
in the EU is a costly and uncertain matter, participation in a network “diversifies potential 
risks and losses” for small regions, and thus “enhances the likelihood of success”. In short, 
there is both safety and strength in numbers – representations of scale – when seeking to 
influence EU policy.  
 
From the institutions point of view, as expressed by Commission official Fredrik Tiger, 
representations of scale, as in the form of networks, are preferable ‘because a network covers 
a lager geographic area’, and thus ‘makes a greater impact’ than actors acting single-
handedly. He describes the situation as such:  
 
During my time at DG Regio I got an extreme amount of enquiries to attend different 
events, and it was impossible to attend them all, but if [the event] is organised by a 
network comprised of actors covering areas in three different countries, it makes a greater 
impact than if the event is organised by one single region. It is also easier to get someone 
from higher up in the hierarchy if you represent a lager geographic area. In other words, it 
is much easier for a network to get heard, listened to, get in touch with and engage in 
dialogue with, the institutions and bring their views and interests forward. 
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However, Tiger also emphasised that gaining access to high-level politicians not always was 
the best way of gaining influence, since “one should always seek to influence the person 
holding the pen”. Meaning that it could be equally rewarding to gain access to and be heard 
by lower-level bureaucrats in charge of drafting the policy before higher-level politicians and 
bureaucrats approves it.  
 
Policymakers are constantly searching for broad support for their policies (Esterling, 2005; 
Mahoney, 2008). Thus, another argument for why representations of scale, such as networks, 
is favoured by the institutions, and especially by the policymakers in the Commission, is that 
they provide a way for them to test for support of the policy. In other words, networks can 
provide policymakers with an indication of the lay of the land, so to speak. Including a 
network of many actors in the policy process increases the chances of this network (with its 
participating actors) supporting the policy proposal, which in turn may foster additional 
support by demonstrating that a large set of interests already stand behind it (Mahoney, 2008). 
Hence, according to Anders Lindholm, Counsellor at the Permanent Representation of 
Sweden to the EU, regions can “by building a network representing several actors and 
interests, become someone the decision-makers have to listen to, have to get input and 
information from, because they represent something larger”.  
 
4.2 Legitimacy  
 
Another argument supporting the claim that networks provide avenues of access to decision-
makers for the participants involved is that networks function as a source of legitimacy for the 
EU institutions, and thus making them important partners to consult in the policy-making 
process. By aggregating regional interests at the transnational level, and by their broad and 
arguably representative membership foundation comprised of both public and private actors, 
networks can be seen as “an important way to generate legitimacy for, and increase the 
acceptance of, the Commission’s initiatives” (Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008: 175). In other 
words, networks provide legitimacy by meeting demands for more citizens’ participation in 
the policy process (Börzel & Heard-Lauréote, 2009: 144). Furthermore, by “enabling societal 
actors to participate directly in making and implementing the services that affect them” 
networks may help the construction of more widely accepted policy outcomes, by providing 
	   41 
feedback to the EU institutions. In this manner they “smooth the way for implementation” 
(Börzel & Heard-Lauréote, 2009: 144).  
 
The presented arguments and reasoning is underpinned by data collected through the 
interviews. According to Jan Edøy, “the Commission is dependent upon regional input in 
order to be able make a cohesion policy”, and “the interaction between the Commission and 
the networks regions participate in is crucial for the Commission, both in terms of policy 
content, policy implementation, and for what they ultimately decide on doing”. There also 
seems to be some truth in the idea that EU officials, especially in the Commission, use 
networks to strengthen their own policy proposals. Former Commission official, now 
counsellor on regional policy, competition and state aid to the Permanent Representation of 
Sweden to the EU, describes the networks’ effect on EU legitimacy as such:  
 
The legitimacy of the decision is improved, because even if the policy does not end up 
just the way [advocates] want it to, important groups feel they have been heard, and that 
they have been part of the decision-making process, and been able to fight for their 
cause, and that [the decision-makers] have considered their input in the process. In the 
end it is all about legitimacy. 
 
One could, based on these arguments, draw the conclusion that participation in a network 
would result in access to, and inclusion in, the policy process, because the EU institutions are 
dependent upon societal input to legitimise their policies. However, this is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. Although “networks can enhance participation by posing as 
intermediaries between levels of governance and can help improve the correspondence 
between ‘rulers’ and ‘the ruled’”, and in this way strengthen legitimacy, “the extent to which 
networks can enhance legitimacy depends on certain scope conditions” (Börzel & Heard-
Lauréote, 2009: 144). That is to say that legitimacy provided by networks is to some extent 
dependent on how the network is structured (Peterson, 2003). Networks are theoretically 
based on the voluntary participation of actors. But, because participation in policy networks 
aimed at advocacy activities is highly time and resource consuming, networks tend to 
encourage the participation of the most active and resourceful interests/actors, which could 
result in networks having an ‘elitist’ and unrepresentative quality (Börzel & Heard-Lauréote, 
2009). Furthermore, although networks are to some extent comprised of publicly elected 
actors, such as local and regional municipalities, they are not subject to external democratic 
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control and accountability, and often have informal and opaque decisional procedures. Thus, 
the legitimacy argument is challenged. According to Fredrik Tiger, one of the main 
challenges for EU officials when dealing with networks is;  
 
One cannot know for sure if the entire network represents the interests and opinions put 
forward by the network, or if their interests are sufficiently anchored within the entire 
area the network represents. In other words, sometimes there can be a divergence between 
opinions of individual actors within the network, and what the network presents as its 
official standpoint. And there is little we can do about that. 
 
This was also reported as a challenge from Anders Lindholm, however, he emphasised that 
networks’ challenge related to reconciling diverging interests “is a human challenge more 
than a structural one”. Regardless of the strength of the legitimacy argument regarding 
networks, it is reasonable to argue that local and regional actors use networks as “a means to 
attain both legitimacy and access to the European institutions” in substitution for the existence 
of a European public space for expressing opinions and interests (Börzel & Heard-Lauréote, 
2009: 144 [my emphasis]).  
 
Legitimacy is not only about gaining access to EU decision-makers for regions, but is equally 
concerned with justification of the region’s presence in Brussels. According to Østhagen,  
 
An important effect of participating in networks for us is that we are perceived as active in 
the EU arena, but it is also related to how we are perceived at home. Our participation, 
especially in the Northern Sparsely Populated Area Network, demonstrates [to our end-
users] that we have opportunities for exercising influence in Brussels, and this strengthens 
our legitimacy at home.  
 
In this way, the Norwegian regional representations in Brussels use participation in 
transnational networks both as a means to gain access to EU decision-makers, but also as an 
argument to underpin the legitimacy of their existence in Brussels to their end users. Thus, 
one can say, that the legitimacy argument is a two way street. Networks are important for 
gaining access to EU institutions because they inhabit the weight of democratic legitimacy at 
the subnational level, and they are important for legitimising regional actors’ presence in 
Brussels because they create such access (2008: 521).  In the words of Østhagen; 
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It is in the regions that legitimacy is anchored. If regions can find utility value in, and ways 
to access, deal with, and relate to the supranational EU-level, above and besides the national 
level, it brings extra legitimacy to the EU. It provides added value to the EU. 
 
In other words, networks can, by being perceived as legitimate and representative actors, 
demonstrate that the services of both the EU institutions, and the regional representations, are 
justifiable to the European, regional and local citizens. Due to this, networks have arguably 
greater possibilities of gaining access to decision-makers, because they are considered 
important partners and players in the EU policy game for both the institutions and the regional 
actors.  
 
 
4.3 Efficiency 
 
Political systems, such as the EU, exist in order to produce solutions to societal problems and 
satisfy the demands of the citizens. This is dependent upon efficiency, which by Börzel and 
Heard-Lauréote is defined as “the production of sufficient policy output without delays or 
deadlocks at reasonable cost” (2009: 140). In other words, efficiency, or effective 
policymaking, like legitimacy, is fundamental in sustaining a political system. However, the 
EU is not just any political system. It is more complex than any national system and not even 
comparable to international organisations. According to Börzel and Heard-Lauréote “the 
emergence of networks has been closely related to the declining effectiveness of hierarchy 
(state failure) in domestic politics and the absence of hierarchy (anarchy) in international 
politics” (2009: 141). Hence, since governments no longer possess or control all the resources 
necessary for producing effective policies to solve societal problems, as argued by MLG 
theory, networks comprised of both public and private actors at the sub-national level can 
augment the quality of policymaking.  
 
There are several ways in which a network can improve the efficiency of a policy process. 
They can do so, as explained earlier, by offering the EU institutions organised and collective 
European input; and thus also improve the legitimacy of the policy. However, networks may 
also enhance efficiency in virtue of their very nature, by being a transnational cooperation 
covering larger geographic areas with diverse participation – which leads us back to the 
representations of scale argument. Additionally, because of their dispersed geographic 
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representation and diverse composition of actors spread over different levels of government, 
networks arguably allow EU policy-makers and officials to reach larger societal groups more 
easily, and also to mobilise these resources more effectively. Efficiency is also a recurring 
topic throughout the data collected in the interviews. According to Jan Edøy, “single actors 
might not be taken seriously, because there are too many actors competing, making it too time 
consuming for the institutions to recognise them all”. Thus, if several regions, or actors, can 
arrive at a common position it is, according to Edøy, “simply worth more”. Furthermore, 
networks, to the extent that these are founded on communication and trust and manage to 
arrive at a common positions, have the ability to negotiate with EU officials in pursuit of 
brokering a compromise to solve policy problems (Börzel & Heard-Lauréote, 2009). Through 
this negotiation function, networks may enhance efficiency in that the EU officials can broker 
an agreement with a network comprised of, for instance, several regions, rather than having to 
speak to each region separately. According to Anders Lindholm, there is truth to this 
argument, since the added value of working with networks is much appreciated in the 
Commission: 
 
When I worked in the Commission, we benefitted from the existence of, and interaction 
with, the Baltic Sea Group network; partly because it enabled us to anchor the policy in the 
regions affected, and to disseminate information about it more efficiently, but it also helped 
strengthen the legitimacy of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. 
 
Based on these statements one can argue that the decision-makers in the EU favour working 
with networks, because they are resource effective partners for officials operating within an 
already strained bureaucracy. 
 
The efficiency argument is also applicable to the regional participants in networks, and both 
the North Norway European Office and the Mid Sweden European Office reported that 
enhanced efficiency was one of the main motivations behind joining a network. It was also 
reported as being one of the most important dividends from participation. According to 
Deogan, participation in a network results in better utilisation of the office’s resource. Since 
their office is relatively small both in terms of staff and budget, they are dependent upon 
pooling their resources with others in order to achieve their objectives. In the words of the 
director Brandelius-Johansson: “We are dependent upon cooperating with others to become 
strong”. Østhagen at the North Norway Office concurs with Deogan and Brandelius-
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Johansson by stating that one of the most important added values of participation in networks 
is that it is “resource-effective”. According to him his office “saves time and resources not 
only in regard to gathering information, but also when organising events, seminars, 
conferences” when participating in a network. In other words, networks can spread the costs 
of expensive advocacy work, so as to enable small actors to do more with less. According to 
Richard Tuffs, director of ERRIN (European Regions Research and Innovation Network) “to 
be able to compete in Brussels one has to keep on working, keep on moving”. Meaning that 
one continuously has to organise events, meetings and seminars so as not to “fall of the map”. 
In a network, such as ERRIN, one can do this together with several other actors collectively, 
providing an easy way to gain ear with high-level politicians and bureaucrats while spreading 
the bill among several small actors. For small regional representations in Brussels with 
limited personnel and resources (which is the case of the Norwegian regions) this is not only 
time efficient but also cost efficient. Consequently, in the words of Østhagen, participation in 
networks is about “pooling resources to amplify ones voice towards the EU institutions in 
order to gain access to the decision-makers, making it easier to get heard.” Additionally, 
regional representations from Norway can reap benefits from cooperating with other actors 
from member states, by utilising these actors’ contacts inside the institutions. In this manner, 
networks can make the process of gaining contacts and access to decision-makers in Brussels 
easier; and hence, be considered as an efficiency-enhancing instrument for actors that are 
seeking political influence outside EU membership. When asked if he could describe how 
participation in a network could add value to his office’s advocacy work, Østhagen replied: 
 
Plain and simple: Additional influence and improved impact. In terms of contacts, and in 
the sense that it opens doors in to the bureaucrats in the Commission who come from 
these countries; or MEPs [Members of the European Parliament]; or other networks that 
they have access too that we don’t. There are quite a few doors that are closed for 
Norway. So it opens a lot of doors in a system where we, as Norwegians, do not have 
formal access. 
 
 
Börzel and Heard-Lauréote (2009: 143) argue that by facilitating the reconciliation of 
diverging interests “networks possess a real capacity to engender increased compliance and 
reduced resistance to policy implementation […] insofar as participating actors go beyond the 
lowest common denominator of their individual interests”. In other words, there are 
limitations to the efficiency-effect of network participation. Most networks are founded on 
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consensus, resulting in that they are driven by the lowest common denominator approach. 
This does not necessarily hinder, or limit, efficiency, as long as the network is comprised of 
rather homogenous actors with similar interests. If this is the case, consensus can be reached 
quite effectively. However, most networks are heterogeneous and are therefore in greater risk 
of ending up in time and resource consuming negotiations, and ultimately a potential deadlock 
(Börzel & Heard-Lauréote, 2009; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008; Peterson, 2003).  
 
According to both the Mid Sweden and the North Norway office, the main challenge related 
to network participation is the concept of the lowest common denominator; or in other words, 
to reach consensus. An example would be the process of drafting a position paper in the 
ERRIN networks. The director of the network, Richard Tuffs, explained that they have 
working and policy groups within different policy areas, comprised of members especially 
interested in these topics. These groups draft position papers on behalf of the network’s 94 
members. All members can send inn contributions in this process and it will be incorporated 
into ERRIN’s official statement.  If one contribution diverges widely from another region’s 
contribution, the diverging interest would be specified in the position paper as a dissent. A 
second option would be to find a way down the middle of position X and position Y, or a 
third option would be to exclude it entirely from the statement. However, ERRIN is not 
altogether dependent upon consensus on all issues. If the network decides to write a statement 
on a policy proposal, and they are restricted on time, they do not have to reach consensus 
among all of their 94 member regions; as long as they include a disclaimer at the end stating 
that it might not reflect the whole opinions of all of its members, the network is free to turn in 
whatever position paper it wants. Having said this, it is important to note that ERRIN, being 
dependent upon active participation form its members for policy input, and their working and 
policy groups being comprised of representatives from members, the network is in good 
condition to reflect the general interests of its participating regions. Nevertheless, the sheer 
size of the network and its aspiration towards achieving consensus endanger the network of 
ending up with position papers and policy statements that are fairly watered down. The 
Northern Sparsely Populated Areas Network (NSPA), on the other hand, operates solely on 
consensus. In this case, a policy position cannot become an official NSPA stance without the 
full consent of all parties involved, which can be a time consuming and difficult process. 
According to Østhagen, an important challenge related to participation in networks is thus 
“finding a balance in resource utilisation”;  
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Network activity and participation is time consuming. You have to ask yourself if it is worth 
it; [network participation] is resource-effective in terms of information activities, and in 
terms of the work you do after you have arrived at a common policy position. But, to get to 
that point takes time. So, one positive aspect of participating in a network can be that it is 
efficient; a negative aspect can be that it is time consuming. It all depends on the policy area 
in question, the balancing of resources and the dynamic in the network. In out case we have 
found that it is worth it. If we found the network not to be worth it, we would quit and it 
would eventually be closed down.  
 
 
Summed up, the effect of participation in a network on an actor’s possibility of gaining access 
to EU decision-makers is twofold. Following the logic of the representations of scale 
argument, small actors gain greater possibilities of accessing EU officials based on the 
argument that aggregated interests are preferred because they provide collective, aggregated 
European interests, legitimacy, and enhance efficiency in the policy process. Furthermore, 
networks have the possibility of gathering support for EU policies and presenting regional 
actors with utility value in the supranational institutions; however, the argument of utility 
value is dependent upon the actors actually being included in the decision-making process. 
Hence, I argue that it is a rational choice from EU officials point of view, to cooperate with 
networks, rather than single actors out of three reasons; (1) they provide input and 
information which is otherwise costly to attain; (2) they gather policy support and add utility 
value to the supranational institutions when involved in the policy process; and (3) they are 
legitimate in that they represent sub-national societal actors in the policy process – all of 
which is linked to the representations of scale-effect. Due to this, one could furthermore 
assume that the Commission is using networks in order to attain some sort of ‘negotiated 
order’ and stable policy environment (Mazey & Richardson, 2006).  
  
Regarding the legitimacy argument it has become evident that all networks are not legitimate 
in se, due to their potentially exclusive, opaque and elitist structure. Furthermore, the 
efficiency argument seems to be a double-edged sword, since participating in a network can 
be resource effective when it comes to sharing the costs and risks involved in advocacy 
activities; while it simultaneously can be equally resource intensive considering challenges 
related to reaching consensus among multiple distinct actors. However, as stated by Østhagen, 
this is a question of balancing, and whether it is worth it or not. Moreover, a network would 
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arguably cease to exist once its participants deem it irrelevant, or superfluous. Hence, the 
conclusion can be drawn that the networks that are active and operating must be considered to 
serve such an important function to its members, that the benefits of participation balances the 
costs. One of these benefits is that they provide their participants with an arena for acting out 
their interests and objectives, and gaining access to the institutions. This is underpinned by the 
fact that both the North Norway and the Mid Sweden office responded that above fifty per 
cent of all contact their offices had with EU institutions was a direct consequence of their 
participation in a network. However, gaining access to decision-makers is closely linked, and 
somewhat dependent upon the next variable up for analysis, namely having a good reputation. 
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5. Reaping a Reputation 
 
Having a reputation as being competent and credible is, perhaps painfully obvious, among the 
most important criteria for gaining influence in the EU (Guéguen, 2008: 76-78). However, the 
existing literature does not go far beyond stating that it is important, before leaving the topic 
altogether, and it says next to nothing about how regional actors proceed when building a 
reputation (Donas & Beyers, 2012; Eliassen & Peneva, 2012; Guéguen, 2008). This chapter is 
concerned with how the network dimension influences regional actors’ reputation, and 
investigates further the following assumptions: 
• 1 (c) Networks are seen as credible and competent partners for the EU institutions 
• 2 (b) Networks can improve the reputation of small-scale, single actors in    
Brussels by profiling them as credible policy actors 
 
According to Diane Stone (Stone, 2002: 3 [My emphasis]), the positive effect a network can 
have on an actor’s reputation can be described as such: 
 
The knowledge credentials and expertise of network actors […] bestow credibility and 
special status in policy debates and give weight to their recommendations. A network 
amplifies and disseminates ideas, research and information to an extent that could not be 
achieved by individuals or institutions alone. Moreover, a network mutually confers 
legitimacy and pools authority and respectability in a positive-sum manner. In other 
words, a network can often be greater than its constituent parts. 
 
However, when seen from a regional perspective, the effect of network participation on a 
regional actor’s reputation, as in the policy environment in Brussels, is ambivalent. Meaning 
that it can have positive effects on the reputation and image of an actor within one policy area, 
whilst at the same time, have negative implications for the same actor’s reputation within 
another. For instance, if the actor has a special status on matters of energy policy, it might do 
better advocating its special qualities, interests and objectives on its own than in a network; 
while simultaneously, the actor could benefit from cooperation with, and the assistance and 
expertise of other actors, on issues such as competition and state aid policy. In other words, 
since the effect participation in a network has on a regional actor’s reputation is dependent 
upon the regional actors inherent characteristics and their qualifications within the policy area 
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in question, a promiscuous branding strategy combining elements of both network 
participation and independent branding would seem to be the rational choice for most regions.  
 
There is an interesting discovery in the empirical data, when viewing this from a Norwegian 
perspective: In the case of the Norwegian regional offices, only the North Norway European 
Office, and to some extent also the Stavanger Region European Office, inhabit the expertise 
and qualities that enable them to promote and profile themselves individually. The South 
Norway European Office and the Oslo Region European Office, on the other hand, are almost 
entirely operating through the ERRIN network when branding themselves, while the Mid-
Norway and West Norway offices are to date not fully committed to such activities. 
 
Finally, all of the interviewees from the supranational and national level confirmed that the 
institutions and other policy actors in Brussels in general considered networks positively, and 
perceived them as credible policy actors, as opposed to single actors.  
 
5.1 Promiscuous Branding  
 
According to Richardson, the very nature of the EU system with its multiple levels of power, 
access point and venues, have resulted in that the “traditional ‘clients’ of national 
governments have become transnationally promiscuous in their relationships” (Richardson, 
2006: 25 [my emphasis]). Accordingly, ‘traditional clients’, such as regions, are increasingly 
looking for multiple ways of ensuring access to decision-makers and possibilities of 
influencing policy. Since the Norwegian government has restricted access to the decision-
making process in the EU, this is especially true in the case of Norwegian regional 
representations. Furthermore, Mazey and Richardson argue that the need to be manoeuvrable 
and have flexible strategies have increased for actors pursuing advocacy. This is due to the 
fact that the ‘multi-venue Euro-policy game’ favours safeguarding by small actors’, by 
applying several strategies simultaneously, in order improve possibilities of success in 
advocacy (Mazey & Richardson, 2006: 256).  
 
This seems to be the case of the North Norway European Office. According to their advisor 
Andreas Østhagen, whether or not they choose to use a network to promote and profile 
themselves “depends on what policy area [they] are seeking to influence”, and how they 
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evaluate their chances of success independently versus in the network. He emphasised that 
“we do utilise our participation in networks when building our reputation, however, in terms 
of the challenges of participating in networks related to the risk of losing our own voice, we 
are extremely happy when we are able to promote ourselves on our own. It is all about finding 
a balance using both channels”.  The North Norway European Office inhabits certain 
characteristics that distinguish them from other regional actors in Brussels (and also from the 
other Norwegian regions): It is an Arctic region with abundant natural resources and expertise 
on arctic conditions. These characteristics and features give them some leeway when building 
a reputation as a credible and competent policy actor, because not many actors can compete 
with their expertise and knowledge on issues concerning Arctic policy. The result is that the 
North Norway European Office has the potential of becoming an important stakeholder and 
dialogue partner for the Commission and the EP on policy issues concerning Arctic policy, 
because they can provide exclusive and unique information. In this sense, they can use their 
exclusive and unique competence to promote themselves as a credible policy actor towards 
the institutions. Østhagen emphasises that this is a strategy the office attempts to use as much 
as possible. When asked if it was correct to say that their office promoted themselves as being 
competent and professional policy actors within these policy issues, in order to gain hearing 
for their input and enhanced influence and impact, he answered: “Most definitely”. He further 
elaborated: 
 
 If we return to one of you first questions, on ‘how regional representations are perceived 
in Brussels’, it is obvious that we are not the first actors that are approached for input and 
information. That we [the North Norway European Office] are increasingly being 
consulted, however, is result of a lot of work on our behalf. You’d think that because we 
are arctic, everyone would come to us and ask our opinions on these issues, but they 
don’t. We have to constantly be present and remind them [the decision-makers] of what 
we are, of our expertise and competence, and of why we are here. And we have to change 
our pitch depending on the topic of discussion, and remind them that they can consult us 
on issues we have expertise on, such as arctic policy, or fisheries. In this sense, building 
our reputation is an important part of underpinning our policy impact in general.  
 
However, the North Norway European Office also utilise network participation when 
managing their branding and reputation building, though, only on issues concerning other 
policy areas, such as regional and state aid policy. In the words of Østhagen:  
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Concerning arctic policy we have sufficient credibility, because there aren’t very 
many arctic actors in Brussels, meaning we don’t have to join forces with Sweden 
or Greenland. However, within the areas of domestic policy, such as regional 
policy and state aid regulations, we are firstly, a very small and insignificant actor 
in terms of economy and population; secondly, we are not members of the EU. 
Thus, in order to gain greater influence, and access channels into the EU system, 
we act within the NSPA network on these issues. 
 
According to the director of the Mid Sweden European Office, Kerstin Brandelius-
Johansson, their office acts mostly through the NSPA network regarding activities involving 
advocacy. Marlene Deogan, advisor at Mid Sweden, states “in terms of promoting ourselves 
politically towards the institutions, the NSPA networks has played a major role for Mid 
Sweden. It opens up access to, and provides a way for us to relate to them, and vice versa”. 
However, she further emphasised that not all activities were carried out under the NSPA 
banner: “We can use the NSPA branding and add to it more information about who we are 
and what the region of Mid Sweden represents. Brussels is a broad arena, and what you 
chose to promote, or how you chose to brand yourself is dependent upon the context in 
which you are operating”. In other words, the case of Mid Sweden further strengthens the 
argument that regional actors Brussels use multiple arenas and strategies for gaining a good 
reputation and enhancing their possibilities of gaining influence in the EU. Deogan further 
explains how they utilise the NSPA network in their branding: 
 
We only use the NSPA banner when acting within the network […] However, there 
are times when we are acting with the NSPA logo, but still promote one of the 
participating regions, Mid Sweden, North Sweden, North Finland, or North 
Norway, individually. However, we use the NSPA banner, and the brand and 
reputation that comes with it, exclusively for the promotion of our advocacy and 
influencing activities.  
 
Not all Norwegian regions are as unique as North Norway, however, and other regions are to 
a larger extent dependent upon participation in networks in order to be perceived as credible 
policy actors. The South Norway European Office is one of the Norwegian regional offices 
with only one permanent employee in Brussels (see Table 2.1). However, the office is an 
active player within certain policy areas, such as the EU funding programs, and is also an 
active participant in the ERRIN network (see Table 2.1). According to Bodil Agasøster, the 
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manager of the South Norway European Office in Brussels, “ERRIN makes it possible to do 
more with fewer resources” (Hanssen, 2012: 18). An example being that they were able to 
(with only one permanent employee and one trainee) host a seminar attended by several 
regional actors along with representatives from both the Commission and the EP, and at this 
event promote and profile their end users and key stakeholders at home (Hanssen, 2012: 18). 
All Norwegian regions, except the West Norway Office, are members in ERRIN, and 
according to Hanssen (2012) they all reported using the network for promoting their regions 
and branding themselves in Brussels, due to the fact that ERRIN was considered to add 
credibility and weight to their reputation. Richard Tuffs, the director of ERRIN, confirms that 
on of the main functions of the network is profiling their participating regions, along with the 
network itself, in Brussels.  
 
Uniqueness might not be the only reason why the North Norway office has advantages over 
other Norwegian regional actors when building a reputation as an advocate in the EU system. 
One of the reasons why the North Norway office is considered successful in influencing 
policy, is, according to Østhagen, because they have a solid political foundation at home as 
their point of departure in Brussels. By actively involving political representatives from the 
three different counties constituting parts of the office’s ownership, in defining the office’s 
objectives and activities, they are able to provide the sort of accountability needed to produce 
a collective platform for branding the region politically. Østhagen explains that this is “an 
essential prerequisite for being able to pursue advocacy and influence in Brussels”. Deogan at 
the Mid Sweden office support Østhagen’s argument by stating: “if we don’t have a solid 
political foundation at home, we cannot pursue advocacy and influence here [in Brussels]. 
Involving local and regional politicians in our work is crucial for being perceived as a 
credible and competent player”. However, according to the NOU (2012:2), most of the 
Norwegian regional representations does not consider advocacy as one of their main 
objectives, explained by the need to adhere to the wishes of their end-users and stakeholders 
responsible for creating the framework of their activities in Brussels. In other words, since the 
people paying the bills are not concerned with influencing EU policy, the representations in 
Brussels not concerned with it either. Accordingly, on might argue that the only thing 
standing in the way of Norwegian regional influence in Brussels, are the regions themselves. 
However, this is not justifiable in the data collected for this thesis, though it could constitute 
an interesting research topic for the future.  
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5.2 Institutional Approval 
 
All of the interviewees from the supranational and national level confirmed that the 
institutions and other policy actors in Brussels in general considered and perceived networks 
positively, and as credible and competent actors. They did not argue that all networks in 
general was perceived this way, but that the networks they knew of and had experiences with 
dealing with, had a good reputation.  
 
According to the Commission official, networks are a “normal part of our every day reality”, 
and he/she further explained that the relationship between the Commission and policy 
networks is reciprocal; “We provide them a service and they provide us a service. It is a 
mutual informative interaction between the two, from which I have personally benefitted in 
my work”. Fredrik Tiger, also Commission official, stated that: “my assessment and 
understanding, based on my experience at DG Regio, is that NSPA and its participants have a 
good reputation”, and that it is “perceived as something that clearly brings added value to the 
work of the Commission”. In his opinion, networks are perceived positively because they 
represent a lager geographic area, thus helping to simplify and streamline information 
exchange in the ‘existence of information abundance’, as described by the other Commission 
official. This is also evident in existing literature on the topic, with Börzel and Heard-
Lauréote arguing: “the European Commission has promoted the creation of networks to 
increase the problem-solving capacity of EU policy-making to develop elements of substitute 
democratic legitimacy” (2009: 146).  
 
When asked to give reasons for why networks were considered in such positive a manner, all 
interviewees responded with various versions of an efficiency argument. According to Jan 
Edøy, the positive perception of networks in the Commission is due to the fact that through 
interacting with transnational policy networks, the Commission has found a way of 
‘bypassing the national capitals’, which in some cases is ‘much more efficient than going the 
national route’. Anders Linholm, on the other hand, underpinned Tiger’s response by saying 
that networks have a positive reputation because “it is quite simply easier for the 
Commission, or any other institution for that matter, to interact with a network comprised of 
several actors, as opposed to dealing with each and every one of them individually”. 
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According to him, networks are furthermore considered to be credible policy actors, providing 
professional information and input to the institutions. This might be due to the fact that they 
are representing aggregated and collective European interest fostering legitimacy, but it could 
also be linked to the fact that well-established networks often have a secretariat with people 
working solely on information gathering and preparing position papers, hence, according to 
Lindholm, enabling them to “obtain a professional level on their input”. Accordingly, one 
could argue that having a secretariat would enhance a networks reputation as being competent 
and professional, hence improving its abilities to gain access to decision-makers, and thus 
also strengthen its abilities to influence EU policy on behalf of its participants.  
 
 
The effect of participation in a network on a regional actor’s reputation seem to be 
exclusively positive when viewed from the perspective of the supranational institutions. 
According to the interviewees themselves, this is explained by the effectiveness of interacting 
with a network as opposed to single actors, along with the perception that networks provide 
more professional input and information. However, according to Wolfram Kaizer (2009: 228), 
fostering and maintain policy networks in the EU can furthermore be considered as “in the 
Commission’s institutional self-interest”, because interacting and cooperating with networks 
maximises its influence vis-à-vis the member states and the other institutions due to the claim 
of legitimacy. However, when viewed from a regional perspective a network’s effect on an 
actor’s reputation is apparently more ambivalent. This is due to the fact that the dynamic, 
complex competitive policy environment in Brussels favours the pursuit of promiscuous 
branding strategies for small actors, in order to safeguard opportunities of successful 
advocacy. Hence, making balancing the use of networks and individual branding the rational 
strategy of small actors when they seek a good reputation in Brussels. Building oneself a good 
reputations, however, is, as stated by Østhagen, a process that requires constant work over 
time, thus making the reputation variable strongly linked to the topic of the next analysis: 
continuity.  
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6. Creating Continuity 
 
 
According to the Commission official in DG Regio: “To have influence on policy and 
regulations [in the EU] is not something that happens over night, it is a long process that 
happens over years”. In other words, it requires some form of continuity. However, Brussels 
is a city with a very high degree of employee turnover. Most people working in the EU capital 
are only stationed there on fixed terms of everything from six months to three years. Few 
people stay longer. Furthermore, continuity is considered a necessary prerequisite for being 
able to build a good reputation of being credible and trustworthy among EU officials. 
Consequently, and as stated by both the Mid Sweden and the North Norway office, continuity 
is considered to be one of the main criteria for successful advocacy work (Guéguen, 2008). 
This might explain why the Commission official was so reluctant in giving specific and 
definite answers on networks’ ability to influence EU policy, since he/she had only been 
employed in the Commission for just over two years, and therefore had, according to him-
/herself, “not sufficient knowledge of how the policy decided on and implemented today had 
been negotiated over the years”. However, two years could be considered the double in 
‘Brussels-years’, because of the high replacement rate and very steep learning curve among 
the people working there (Huysseune & Jans, 2008; Moore, 2008). 
 
According to the Official Norwegian Report on Norway’s relations with the EU, all 
Norwegian non-governmental actors in Brussels, regional representations included, reported 
that continuity and long-term perspective was one of the most important prerequisites for 
pursuing advocacy activities successfully in Brussels (NOU 2012:2). However, the majority 
of Norwegian regional representations have less than three permanent employees, and replace 
the majority of their workforce every six to twelve months (see Table 2.1 for an overview 
over the number of employees at the various Norwegian regional offices) (Eliassen & Peneva, 
2012). This speaks of low continuity and limited abilities to build a valuable reputation in the 
EU capital, and thus also of restricted possibilities of influencing EU policy. This analysis dig 
deeper into the following hypothesis: 2 (d) Networks are favourable in that they provide a 
sense of continuity in a policy environment with a high degree of political uncertainty and 
employee turnover.  
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Based on the logic representing the policy network approach, one can argue that due to the 
human dimension of networks, they function as socialisation instruments furthering continuity 
in the work activities of small actors in Brussels. Data collected through the interviews 
support this line of reasoning. Furthermore, networks can become reliable partners for the EU 
institutions, in that they inhabit certain values, expertise and knowledge which they transfer to 
new members and the new employees of their participants, thus creating a knowledge transfer 
furthering continuity in interaction between the network and the institutions. This also creates 
some form of stability and may create path dependencies, which further improves continuity 
and stability.  
 
6.1 Human Dimension 
 
Networks have an important human dimension, in that they function as socialisation 
instruments for new members of the network (Börzel & Heard-Lauréote, 2009). Upon 
entering into a network, participants most commonly have little experience with participating 
in the EU policy processes, and they may also have diverging value systems and conflicting 
interests and views of the policy issue at hand. In other words, they arrive with what Schön 
and Rein (1994) call competing “policy frames”, creating a process of “frame reflection” 
(quoted in Richardson, 2006: 13-14). This is a three step process: (1) recognition of each 
other as legitimate stakeholders within the policy area; (2) recognising that collaborations 
may be the best means of achieving policy gains; (3) a desire to achieve negotiated and stable 
policy environments in preference of instability and uncertainty (Richardson, 2006). Upon 
realising stable cooperation, such as in a network, they will learn, by working together, what 
kind of change is feasible and what change that would be unproductive. Then, according to 
Richardson (2006: 10), the participants in the network “will begin to debate in the same 
language (if not with the same values), and arguments will be treated seriously only if 
discussed in these common criteria”. And, according to both the Commission official in DG 
Regio, and Jan Edøy at the Norwegian Mission to the EU, one has to speak the ‘EU-language’ 
in order to get heard and be taken seriously. This human dimension and socialisation effect 
derived from participating networks thus becomes an important tool in the EU policy process, 
both to efficiently create functioning policy actors, and to create some degree of stable and 
continuous dialogue between the Commission and the stakeholders.  
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In a complex and crowded political system, such as in the EU, cooperation in networks is a 
sound strategy, because actors are operating under immense degrees of uncertainty in what is, 
as mentioned, very long-running games. In this sense, and in accordance with the policy 
network approach, one can argue that networks provide continuity to their participants 
operations by socialising new members into the policy process by relaying shared meanings, 
values and practices. These meanings, values and practices are developed through the 
continued interaction between the network participants creating and furthering the use of a 
common language and common policy culture. In this sense, efficiency is also improved 
because new members are taught how to behave in the European policy environment, and 
they become functioning policy actors quicker. According to Börzel and Heard-Lauréote 
(2009: 142), this is valuable to the EU institutions, because it “is an important mechanism for 
deepening the European integration process”, and can also help explain why networks are 
given access more easily than single actors in the policy process.  
 
The argument that networks adds to a participant’s continuity through this socialisation 
process finds support in the interview data. According to the director of the Mid Sweden 
office, Brandelius-Johansson, there is a weakness in being a small actor in Brussels, because 
you risk loosing so much of the office’s knowledge and competence when an employee leaves 
or is replaced. However, participating in a network can compensate for some of this 
weakness, because regardless of the coming and going of participants in the network and their 
employees, the work within the network will have a continuous flow; it will, as Richard Tuffs 
said, “keep on working, keep on moving”. Brandelius-Johansson describes the effect in these 
words:   
 
It is a strength to be part of a network, built on trust and competence, especially in terms of 
continuity; because it means that every one of us does not need to inhabit all the knowledge, 
and all the contacts on our own. Participating in a network means sharing your knowledge 
and contacts with other, and vice versa. Thus, being in a network strengthen our office’s 
continuity, because even if we replace an employee, the work in the network will always 
pick up again. 
 
In other words, because the knowledge is shared, it is never lost. However, the North 
Norway European Office and the Mid Sweden European Office both stress the fact that 
participation in a network can never replace, or entirely compensate for lack of continuity 
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in the office’s work and activities. It is important to ensure that you have both, for 
instance by logging the office’s activities and writing down important information for 
archiving. Nevertheless, networks can somewhat lax the tension of an office’s continuity, 
and also make it easier to train and educate new employees on policy work in the EU. As 
Østhagen at the North Norway office stated, “participation in a network, such as the 
NSPA, will ultimately affect our continuity in terms of knowledge transfer to new 
employees”.  
 
The human dimension of policy network, it seems, foster continuity by the development 
of a certain dynamic and knowledge culture within the network, along with internal 
norms and values. These will inevitably transfer to new members and new employees, 
creating continuity in the policy work of all participants. This dynamic and internal 
culture is reciprocal. According to Østhagen, the existing knowledge culture and norms 
within the network will affect the new participants, but the new participants and 
employees will also affect the network’s internal dynamic:  
 
By being in constant interaction and exchange with the other participants in a network, 
our office will continue to focus on the policy issues that is important within the 
network.  For instance, if we were to leave the NSPA network, regional policy would 
probably no longer be such an important focus for our office. In this sense, 
participation in a network can strengthen our office’s continuity in terms of our work 
on regional policy. Furthermore, the continuity that networks can provide is to some 
extent dependent on persons. Meaning, that although new participants will be taught 
and absorbed into the basic activities, interests, objectives and functions of the 
network, they will also be able to influence and affect the network itself. 
 
 
6.2 Path Dependency 
 
The human dimension-argument is endogenous, meaning it describes the effect a network has 
on its participants. However, the effect a network can have on continuity can also have an 
endogenous character; namely the institutionalisation of transnational advocacy. According to 
Richardson (2006), the political environment in Brussels is characterised by high levels of 
uncertainty when it comes to predicting policy outcomes. This is the result of power and 
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influence being dispersed across multiple levels of decision-making, implementation being 
delegated to multiple institutions across different societal levels, and how incredible open and 
permeable the EU institutions are to policy advocates. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to 
identify where a policy ‘started’ in the EU, and also to some extent, where what was decided, 
and when; hence the common response that “policies seem to come from nowhere” 
(Richardson, 2006: 21). The open bureaucracy of the Commission encourages advocacy, 
while the political opacity of the decision-making process allows a variety of actors to take 
credit for the outcomes (Keating & Hooghe, 2006). Add to this Commission’s dependency on 
input, and it is not really hard to understand why organised interests, in the form of networks, 
are much-preferred partners in the policy process.   
 
In these uncertain policy circumstances, the Commission has recognised that the 
institutionalisation of interests, and the interaction with such, is a good form of ‘risk 
reduction’ (Mazey & Richardson, 2006), and also a good way to establish some stability and 
continuity in the Brussels-cacophony of interests. According to Mazey and Richardson (2006: 
249), the Commission can, “by seating the appropriate stakeholders at the appropriate seats”, 
reduce anticipated resistance to their policy initiatives in other arenas, and subsequently avoid 
the sole blame for possible policy failures or fiascos. According to Jan Edøy, because the 
system in the EU is structured the way it is, “networks have a certain status to the 
Commission” and is also why “it favours aggregated interests”. If a transnational policy 
network gains a good reputation for being competent and credible, and manages to establish 
some form of partnership with the Commission, this network can have long-lasting effects on 
the perceptions and behaviours of other actors, by being ‘meaningful objects of identification’ 
(Mazey & Richardson, 2006: 252). Consequently, other actors will seek to emulate the 
behaviour of the network and its participants, because their actions appear to bear fruit. Thus, 
a network can create some kind of path dependency in the EU, fostering stability, 
predictability and continuity in the policy-making process.   
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7. Informative Interaction in Representations of Scale 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to answer the research question; to what extent, and how, can 
Norwegian regional offices in Brussels act as gateways for influence in the EU through 
participation in transnational networks? It sought to do so by measuring the effects 
participation in transnational networks had on three distinct characteristics considered to be 
crucial for having success in advocacy in the EU, namely access, reputation, and continuity. 
 
Regarding the effect of network participation on a regional actor’s possibilities of gaining 
access to decision-makers in the EU, the analyses has shown that network participation 
enhances the possibilities of gaining access in general. The main findings showed that by 
participating in transnational networks, Norwegian regional actors become part of 
‘representations of scale’, representing lager geographic areas and aggregated European 
interests, which is considered to enhance both the efficiency and the legitimacy in the policy 
process, which as perceived as favourable in the Commission. The result being that they are 
consulted more included and consulted in the policy process more easily than small-scale 
single actors. Regarding legitimacy, it was argued that transnational networks, by mobilising 
societal actors at the subnational level and enabling them to participate actively in the EU 
decision-making process, they can be seen as a possible way of reducing the EUs democratic 
deficit. However, because  
 
In terms of legitimacy, the assumptions was that transnational networks, by mobilising 
societal actors at the subnational level and enabling them to participate in the EU policy 
process, could be seen as a way of reducing the democratic deficit, and thus being of essential 
importance to EU decision-makers. However, the results of the analysis showed that this was 
not as clear-cut as it might have sounded.  Networks, due to their potentially exclusive, 
opaque and elitist structure, and not being directly accountably to citizens, are not legitimate 
in se. Nevertheless, throughout the analyses, the data from the interviews emphasised 
legitimacy as an added value derived from network participation, both in terms of justifying 
access to decision-makers, in terms of justifying decision-makers preferring interaction and 
cooperation with giving networks above single actors. Another interesting finding was that 
regional representations used participation in networks to justify their presence in Brussels to 
their end-users, because such participation was considered to improve possibilities of 
influencing EU policy.  
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Regarding efficiency, it was assumed that transnational networks enhanced efficiency in the 
policy process by being aggregated European interests representing larger geographic areas, 
and in this way enhancing efficiency in the policy process by simplifying and streamlining the 
information exchange. Furthermore, it was argued, from a regional perspective, that network 
participation was resource efficient, thus enabling small-scale regional offices to pursue 
advocacy despite having limited resources.  The findings in the analysis of the empirical data 
support the first argument, and none of the interviewees’ responses were contradictory. In 
terms of the argument of resource efficiency, the analysis found that participation in networks 
could be resource efficient, in terms of splitting the high costs of pursuing advocacy with 
other actors within the network. However, it could also be resource intensive, due to the fact 
that most networks are operating on consensus, leading to challenges with overcoming the 
lowest common denominator through time-consuming negotiations to arrive at a common 
position.  
 
When the effect participation in a network had on an actor’s reputation was analysed, the 
assumption that network participation improved an actor’s reputation as being a credible and 
competent policy actor, was put to the test. First of all, the findings revealed a perception 
division between the regional and the supranational division: All interviewees representing 
the supranational level confirmed the assumption put forward, and concurred to it; whereas 
interviewees representing the regional level, all presented the effect to be ambivalent. 
Whether the effect was positive or negative was described as being dependent upon the 
regional actors inherent characteristics and what qualifications they had within different 
policy areas. Hence, the conclusion was drawn that the rational choice for an actor was to 
safeguard itself against potential advocacy failures (and a consequent impaired reputation), by 
pursuing promiscuous branding strategies using both participation in networks, and, 
individual profiling activities to build a reputation as a competent and credible policy actor.  
 
In terms of continuity, the assumption was put forward that participation in transnational 
networks could improve an actor’s continuity within a policy environment of high political 
uncertainty and employee turnover, due to their human dimension and socialisation function.  
The analyses found that networks indeed did improve continuity: By relying shared meanings, 
values, and practices, it was shown that networks could create a knowledge transfer fostering 
continuity. Furthermore, the analyses found that successful networks could foster stability and 
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continuity by creating path dependencies and becoming ‘meaningful objects of identification’, 
leading other networks and actors to emulate their behaviour.  
 
All things considered, the three analyses have shown that participation in transnational 
networks improves an actor’s possibilities of gaining access to decision-makers; that they in 
certain situations can be used to improve an actor’s reputation as in the policy process, and 
that networks are perceived positively in, and as adding value to, the supranational level; and, 
finally, that network participation improves an actor’s continuity. In other words, all 
necessary prerequisites for being able to successfully influence EU policy could be provided 
by a network. However, this does not automatically translate to Norwegian regional 
representation becoming ‘gateways of influence in the EU’ by participating in such. As 
emphasised in chapter five, in order to influence EU policy Norwegian regions need a 
mandate from their end-users, a political foundation on which to justify their policy advocacy, 
and a political position to advocate. However, because Norwegian regions are subordinate the 
category administrative regions, few Norwegian regions have the political foundation at 
home, needed for pursuing advocacy in Brussels; hence, they will not be fully able to exploit 
the possibilities and opening created by participating in transnational policy networks. 
Furthermore, it would be naïve to state that Norwegian regions can become gateways for 
influence, in general, for two reasons: 1) Regional actors are only decisive policy actors 
within the areas concerning regional policy. And 2) Regional actors will advocate regional 
interests and preferences, as opposed to general Norwegian interests and preferences. 
Accordingly, it would be more correct to draw the conclusion that Norwegian regional 
representations could become gateways for Norwegian regional influence when participating 
in transnational policy networks, if they have the necessary political foundation at home. 
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix 1 
 
 
Interview Guide – External Actors 
 
Tema: Norske regioners deltakelse i europeiske nettverk.  
 
Forskningsspørsmål:  I hvilken grad, hvis overhodet, kan norske regioner og deres 
deltakelse i europeiske nettverksorganisasjoner, formelle og uformelle, virke som kanaler for 
økt innflytelse i EU? 
 
Praktisk informasjon: 
 -­‐ Ønsker å bruke lydopptaker under intervjuet -­‐ Lydopptakene vil transkriberes -­‐ Hvis det er ønskelig kan kopi av transkripsjon sendes for sitatsjekk og eventuelle 
korreksjoner 2 uker etter intervjuet -­‐ Lydopptakene vil bli slettet ved fullført oppgave – senest 15. mai 2013 -­‐ Hvis ønskelig kan informanten anonymiseres 
 
Gjennom intervjuer ønsker jeg å kartlegge hvorfor norske regioner deltar i europeiske 
nettverksorganisasjoner og hvilken merverdi de føler slik deltakelse har for deres arbeid.  
 
Videre ønsker jeg å få mer informasjon om hvordan slike nettverk blir oppfattet av 
representanter i EUs institusjoner, hovedsakelig kommisjonen og parlamentet, samt hvilken 
merverdi slike nettverk har for disse institusjonene.  
 
Målet er å finne ut om regionene får økt innflytelse i EU gjennom deltakelse i nettverk.  
 
Konteksten for oppgaven er Europautredingen (NOU 2012:2).  
 
Intervjuene vil være halvstrukturerte hvor spørsmålene vil være formulert på forhånd, men 
hvor utdypningsspørsmål og nye spørsmål vil komme til underveis i samtalen.  
 
 
 
 
Overordnede tema: 
 Erfaringer 
 Omdømme og holdninger 
 Merverdi og utbytte for institusjonene 
 Samarbeid og struktur 
 Innflytelse og resultater 
 
Generell informasjon: 
• Navn: 
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• Stilling / representerer: 
• Nasjonalitet: 
 
 
Erfaringer: 
 
1. Hvordan vil du karakterisere EUs styringsform?  
 
2.  Hvordan vil du karakterisere EUs beslutningsprosess?  
 
3. Hvordan vil du karakterisere regioners rolle i EU?  
 
4. Hvordan vil du karakterisere nettverks rolle i EU?  
 
5. Har nettverk i dine øyne en funksjon i EUs beslutningsprosess? 
 
6. I så fall, hvilken funksjon? 
 
7. Hvor mye kontakt har du hatt med nettverk i ditt arbeid? 
 
8. Hva er dine erfaringer fra denne kontakten / dette samarbeidet? 
 
a. Har nettverk vært til hjelp i ditt arbeid? 
b. Har nettverk vært distraherende i ditt arbeid? 
c. Har nettverk vært tidkrevende? 
d. Har nettverk vært tidsbesparende? 
 
Omdømme og holdninger: 
 
9. Hvordan vil du karakterisere omdømmet til NSPA og ERRIN i Brussel /EU ? 
 
10. Hvordan vil du karakterisere omdømmet til nettverk generelt? 
 
11. Hvordan ser du på regioners deltakelse i nettverk med tanke på omdømmet til 
regionen? 
 
12. Har du noen erfaringer med å jobbe med nettverk versus enkeltaktører? 
 
Merverdi og utbytte: 
 
13. Har du / din institusjon hatt utbytte av å samarbeide med nettverk? 
14. I så fall, kan du gi noen konkrete eksempler på slikt utbytte? 
 
15. Er det noen utfordringer knyttet til å samarbeide med nettverk? 
 
a. Hvis ja, hvilke? Hvordan er det utfordrende? Og er det noe som kan gjøres noe 
med? 
b. Hvis nei, hva er det som har gjort at det ikke er utfordrende? 
 
16. Har samarbeidet / kontakten med nettverk vært strukturert på noen måte? 
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a. Hvis ja, hvordan? 
b. Hvis nei, burde det være strukturert, og i så fall hvordan? 
 
13.  
 
Innflytelse og resultater: 
 
17. Hvordan vil du definere innflytelse?  
 
18. Hvordan vil du definere påvirkning?  
 
19. Etter din oppfatning, hva er kriteriene for suksessfullt påvirkningsarbeid?  
 
20. Kan du si noe om forholdet mellom region, stat, EU?  
 
a. Hvordan spiller nettverk inn her? 
 
21. Har du noen konkrete eksempler på samarbeid du har hatt med nettverk? 
 
22. Har du noen konkrete resultater av samarbeid med nettverk? 
 
23. Hvordan vil du karakterisere arbeidet nettverk som NSPA og ERRIN gjør? 
 
24. Er det riktig å si at slike nettverk blir hørt i beslutningsprosessen? 
 
a. Hvis ja, hvordan og hvorfor? 
b. Hvis nei, hvorfor ikke? 
 
25. Er det riktig å si at nettverk har innflytelse i beslutningsprosessen? 
a. Hvis ja, har du noen konkrete eksempler på dette? 
b. Hvis nei, burde nettverk bli inkludert eller ikke – hvorfor? 
 
26. Sett i lys av dine erfaringer, hvilken merverdi kan slike nettverk ha for 
beslutningsprosessen i EU? 
 
27. Er det noe mer du ønsker å tilføye? 
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Tema: Norske regioners deltakelse i europeiske nettverk.  
 
Forskningsspørsmål:  I hvilken grad, hvis overhodet, kan norske regioner og deres 
deltakelse i europeiske nettverksorganisasjoner, formelle og uformelle, virke som kanaler for 
økt innflytelse i EU? 
 
Praktisk informasjon: 
 -­‐ Ønsker å bruke lydopptaker under intervjuet -­‐ Lydopptakene vil transkriberes -­‐ Hvis det er ønskelig kan kopi av transkripsjon sendes for sitatsjekk og eventuelle 
korreksjoner 2 uker etter intervjuet -­‐ Lydopptakene vil bli slettet ved fullført oppgave – senest 15. mai 2013 -­‐ Hvis ønskelig kan informanten anonymiseres 
 
Gjennom intervjuer ønsker jeg å kartlegge hvorfor norske regioner deltar i europeiske 
nettverksorganisasjoner og hvilken merverdi de føler slik deltakelse har for deres arbeid.  
 
Videre ønsker jeg å få mer informasjon om hvordan slike nettverk blir oppfattet av 
representanter i EUs institusjoner, hovedsakelig kommisjonen og parlamentet, samt hvilken 
merverdi slike nettverk har for disse institusjonene.  
 
Målet er å finne ut om regionene får økt innflytelse i EU gjennom deltakelse i nettverk.  
 
Konteksten for oppgaven er Europautredingen (NOU 2012:2).  
 
Intervjuene vil være halvstrukturerte hvor spørsmålene vil være formulert på forhånd, men 
hvor utdypningsspørsmål og nye spørsmål vil komme til underveis i samtalen.  
 
 
 
 
Overordnede tema for intervjuet:  
 Hvorfor nettverk? 
 Form og funksjon 
 Utbytte og merverdi 
 Omdømme til nettverk 
 Innflytelse og resultater 
 
Generell informasjon: 
• Hvilken region? 
• Antall ansatte? 
• Struktur / eierforhold? 
• Hovedoppgaver og funksjon? 
 
 
1. Hvordan vil du karakterisere regioners rolle i EU?  
 
2. Hvordan vil du karakterisere nettverks rolle i EU?  
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Hvorfor nettverk: 
 
3. Hva var kontorets motivasjon for å bli med i et nettverk? 
 
4. Hvilke nettverk er kontoret medlem i?  
 
5. Hvorfor nettopp disse nettverkene?  
 
6. Hvor lenge har kontoret vært medlem?  
 
7. Hvorfor valgte kontoret å delta i nettverk?  
 
Form og funksjon: 
 
8. Hvordan er arbeidet i nettverkene strukturert? 
 
9. Hvordan brukes nettverk i forhold til kontorets arbeidsoppgaver og funksjon?  
 
a. Informasjon 
b. Overvåkning 
c. Innflytelse 
 
10. Kan du si noe om kontinuitet i kontorets arbeid? 
 
11. Har deltakelse i nettverk noen effekt på kontorets kontinuitet? 
 
12. Hvor ofte har kontoret kontakt med de forskjellige institusjonene? 
 
a. Kommisjonen 
b. EP 
c. Rådet 
 
13. Hvor ofte er denne kontakten en konsekvens av deltakelse i nettverk? 
 
14. Kan du si noe om innholdet og formen på denne kontakten? 
 
a. Er den formell? 
b. Er den uformell? 
c. Er den relatert til kontorets arbeid? 
d. Er den viktig for kontorets arbeid – i så fall på hvilken måte? 
 
Utbytte og merverdi: 
 
15. Har kontoret noe utbytte av å delta i nettverk?  
 
a. Hvis ja, hvordan vil du beskrive dette utbyttet? 
 
b. Hvis nei, hvorfor ikke? 
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c. Hvis nei, hvorfor deltar kontoret i dette/disse nettverkene da? 
 
16. Er det noen utfordringer knyttet til å delta i nettverk? 
 
a. Hvis ja, hvordan vil du beskrive utfordringer knyttet til å delta i nettverk? 
b. Hvis nei, hva er det som gjør at det ikke er det?  
i. Homogenitet vs. Heterogenitet? 
ii. Like forutsetninger; geografisk, økonomisk, størrelse, mål, visjon… 
 
Omdømme: 
 
17. Hvordan ønsker du at din region skal oppfattes i Brussel? 
 
18. Hvordan ønsker du at regionskontoret skal oppfattes hjemme i regionen? 
 
19. Hvilket inntrykk har du av hvordan nettverket/-ene oppfattes utad?  
a. Av kommisjonen 
b. Av parlamentet  
c. Av andre nettverk 
d. Av andre aktører i Brussel 
e. Hjemme i regionen 
 
Innflytelse og resultater: 
 
20. Hvordan vil du definere innflytelse?  
 
21. Hvordan vil du definere påvirkning?  
 
22. Etter din oppfatning, hva er kriteriene for suksessfullt påvirkningsarbeid?  
 
23. Er det viktig for ditt kontor å påvirke? 
 
a. Hvis ja, hvorfor og hvordan? 
b. Hvis nei, hvorfor ikke? 
 
24. Hvilken rolle spiller lokale/regionale forhold for kontorets virke i Brussel?  
 
25. Hvilken betydning har kontorets forankring hjemme?  
 
26. Hvordan er ditt kontors forankring?  
 
a. Hvis god, hva er det som gjør den god? 
b. Hvis dårlig, hva er dårlig og hvordan kan det forbedres?  
 
27. Er det viktig for ditt kontor å ha innflytelse og å kunne påvirke?  
 
28. Er det for deg en sammenheng mellom nettverk og påvirkningsarbeid?  
 
29. Har kontorets arbeid og rutiner endret seg etter deltakelse i nettverk?  
a. Hvis ja, hvordan? 
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b. Hvis nei, hva er det som gjør at dette ikke har endret seg? 
 
30. Har kontorets mål, strategi og funksjon endret seg etter deltakelse i nettverk?  
a. Hvis ja, hvordan? 
b. Hvis nei, hva er det som gjør at dette ikke har endret seg? 
 
31. Kan du fortelle om noen konkrete eksempler og resultat av arbeid i nettverk?  
 
 
32. Er det noe mer du vil tilføye?  
 
 
 
